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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Establishment of the proper level of traffic control on low-volume rural roads can be 
problematic for local agencies. Intersections in particular present challenges for engineers 
in selecting appropriate control for varying situations. The Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices (MUTCD) presents limited guidance for STOP and YIELD signs 
applications in Part 5—Traffic Control Devices for Low Volume Roads. Part 2 of the 
MUTCD discourages the overuse of regulatory signs and lists general applications for 
installation of STOP and YIELD signs. Excessive use of STOP signs in particular is 
thought to encourage disrespect and violations by drivers, add operational costs to agency 
budgets, and expose agencies to potential liability for deficient maintenance. However, 
no published guidelines for the removal of unneeded two-way stop control apparently 
exist, and local agencies are reluctant to undertake this action even at ultra-low-volume 
intersections (identified in this report as intersections with less than 150 daily entering 
vehicles [DEV]). 
This study had two primary objectives. The first was to assess the safety performance of 
stop-controlled versus uncontrolled intersections at ultra-low-volume unpaved roads for a 
large data set (over 6000 intersections in Iowa and 10 years of data). The second 
objective was to develop criteria to assess the excessive use of stop control and analyze 
the effects of extensive versus lesser use of STOP signs. Legal implications were also 
studied, and guidance was developed for the safe removal of unneeded control.  
Current literature reviewed with this study included the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices and Institute of Transportation Engineers Traffic Control Devices 
Handbook. While providing basic guidance for intersection control, neither document 
includes definitive recommendations for ultra-low-volume roadways or any guidance for 
removal of unneeded control. Previous research reports indicated somewhat conflicting 
conclusions—some recommending more extensive use of yield control and others finding 
better crash histories through the use of stop control. However, none of the reviewed 
reports considered the effects of various control levels at ultra-low-volume rural 
intersections. 
To determine the scope of practice in Iowa, a survey was sent to county engineers on 
practices and policies for the installation of traffic control at rural local road intersections. 
Information sought in the survey included type of control utilized, criteria employed for 
determining level of control, use of engineering studies, and adoption of formal policies 
for application of stop control. Twenty-nine of Iowa’s ninety-nine counties responded to 
the survey. 
In addition to the survey responses, nineteen counties furnished data describing the 
locations of STOP and YIELD signs in their jurisdictions. Following the selection of all 
unpaved study intersections, crash history was reviewed for a ten-year period. These data 
indicated that, in general, stop-controlled intersections exhibit lower totals for number of 
crashes, average crash rate, average severity, and average cost per crash than 
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uncontrolled intersections. However, crash rates at both stop and uncontrolled unpaved 
intersections in Iowa are very low.  
Rural Analysis 
To identify relationships within the data, a descriptive statistical analysis was conducted, 
considering 6,846 unpaved rural intersections. Fifty-six percent of these intersections 
were uncontrolled, and approximately ninety-two percent of all study intersections had 
not recorded a crash over a ten-year period (There was an insufficient number of yield-
controlled intersections in the database to make any statistically significant conclusions 
regarding the use of YIELD signs; therefore, yield control was not studied in depth in this 
project.). 
An initial analysis indicated that numbers and rates of crashes both increase as DEV 
increases. In addition, a difference in safety performance between stop-controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections was first noted around 70 DEV. At traffic volumes above this 
point, stop-controlled locations exhibit fewer crashes, while with lower DEV, little 
difference between types of control can be observed. 
An approximate total cost analysis was completed for differing levels of control, 
assuming a delay of seven seconds per vehicle for stop control (verified in field trials), 
vehicle operating cost of $15 per hour, and annual sign maintenance/replacement cost of 
$50 per intersection. Factoring in total costs, the performance of stop-controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections was found to be essentially the same below 150 DEV.  
Due to the small range of variance in the number of crashes recorded at these 
intersections, a logistic regression was completed to establish the relationship between 
type of control, DEV, and the probability of a crash occurrence over a ten-year period. In 
this analysis, safety performance of stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections 
diverges at a point near 100 DEV. Above this traffic volume level, the probability of at 
least one crash in a ten-year period increases more dramatically for uncontrolled locations 
than for stop controlled. At lower volumes, little difference in safety performance was 
noted. 
As part of this study, the suggestion that excessive use of STOP signs might indirectly 
contribute to an increased number of crashes in a jurisdiction was tested. In an initial 
attempt to investigate this phenomenon, the fraction of stop-controlled intersections for 
each county was determined and plotted against average crash rate. This plot indicated 
that crash rates declined as the level of control increased. Furthermore, it was found that 
this observation for unpaved intersection crashes was apparently unaffected by the 
overall crash rate in a specific county. When the average crash rate was adjusted for 
DEV, similar results were obtained. 
xii 
A STOP sign placed in response to sight distance limitations would not be considered 
excessive or unneeded, but sight distance was not available for study area intersections. 
Therefore, a terrain factor was developed to act as a surrogate for the expected fraction of 
stop control required for sight distance. United States Geographical Services (USGS) 
maps were used to determine terrain factors for each study county considering 
topography and land cover. Combining minimum volume thresholds with various terrain 
factor formulations (provided for sensitivity analysis), estimated numbers of needed or 
“justified” stop-controlled intersections were calculated. When the fraction of excess 
STOP signs was plotted against crash rate, it was found again that adding STOP signs 
appeared to reduce crash rates. A field survey of three of the study area counties indicated 
that the terrain factor computed “justified fraction” matched two counties well (Adams 
and Boone), but failed to accurately estimate the fraction in the third county (Madison). 
The effect of excessive use of STOP signs on safety performance was investigated further 
using an “average” county as the standard for the number of stop-controlled intersections 
per county. Cherokee County, with a relatively low number of stop-controlled 
intersections (93) and average topography, traffic volumes, and land cover, was selected 
as the “average” county. A ratio based on Cherokee County stop control was calculated 
for all study counties and plotted against average observed crash rates. This analysis 
method also indicated a general decrease in crashes with the increasing use of STOP 
signs. 
Safety performance in counties with more than twice the number (this factor was 
subjectively determined to explore the potential explanatory power of the factor) of stop-
controlled intersections of Cherokee County was compared to the performance in other 
counties. When plotted, trends for the two groups cross at approximately 125 DEV, 
indicating that above that volume, the excessive use of STOP signs may be detrimental to 
safety performance. This finding is contradictory to earlier findings.  
A crash type examination revealed that most crashes at intersections on ultra-low-
volume, unpaved rural roads are caused by driver’s failure to yield the right-of-way. At 
stop-controlled locations, most of these crashes occurred after a driver had stopped but 
then proceeded to pull into the path of another vehicle. Ignoring or not seeing a STOP 
sign was not listed as a major crash cause. Broadside/right angle was the primary crash 
type at both control types. 
Impacts of driver age on crash statistics were examined considering 65-year-old drivers 
and older, as well as those 19-year-old and younger. Regardless of control type, it was 
found that drivers in the younger group are slightly overrepresented in these intersection 
crashes. Older drivers, by contrast, are involved in crashes at these ultra-low-volume 
intersections at a much lower rate than the overall statewide average for all crashes for 
that age group. From this, it was concluded that older drivers either avoid these locations 
or use appropriate care when passing through the intersections.  
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Urban Study 
To study the effects of intersection control in an urban area, an in-depth review of non-
signalized intersections was undertaken in the City of Ames using video logging. Five 
levels of control were compared for a ten-year crash history. The best safety performance 
was observed at all-way stop control. Yield control exhibited the highest crash rate, 
followed by no control, traffic signal, and two-way stop (the rates for the latter three 
control types were very similar).  
A hierarchical Poisson model was fitted to the Ames crash data. The model showed that 
signal-controlled intersections have significantly higher crash rates, two-way stop-
controlled intersections have significantly lower crash rates, and there was no difference 
in crash rates between the all-way and the uncontrolled intersections.  
To investigate the possible effect of excessive STOP sign use in an urban area, 
neighborhood crash rates were compared to city-wide averages. For this limited urban 
application, increased use of stop control would seem to have a positive impact on safety 
performance. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research found that ultra-low-volume (< 150 DEV) unpaved rural intersections 
experience no adverse impact on safety performance due to type of control. Agencies that 
have erected STOP signs in these locations in the past may desire to remove perceived 
unneeded control. 
Recommended procedures for removal or conversion of two-way stop control from ultra-
low-volume rural locations include (1) establishment of a formal policy, (2) consultation 
with agency legal counsel and traffic control experts, (3) review of MUTCD applications 
for STOP and YIELD signs, (4) appropriate public notice, and (5) documentation and 
follow-up review. 
A review of potential liability exposure concluded that agencies should not be exposed to 
tort claims for removal or conversion of unneeded stop control if adequate notice is 
provided and an adopted policy is followed. 
If removal or conversion of unneeded STOP signs is desired, agencies may consider more 
extensive use of YIELD signs at locations where visibility is hampered for part of the 
year due to crops. Additional study of low-volume intersection control in urban areas is 
needed, and a long term (3–5 years) investigation of actual removal of two-way stop 
control and/or conversion to yield control would be beneficial. 
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Conclusions drawn from this research include: 
•	 Ultra-low-volume (< 150 DEV) unpaved rural intersections exhibit much 
lower crash rates than experienced on local rural roads in general. 
•	 Most prominent crash type at these locations is failure to yield right-of-way, 
regardless of control type. 
•	 Above approximately 150 DEV, uncontrolled rural intersections exhibit 
increasingly higher crash rates when compared to stop controlled. 
•	 For ultra-low-volume (< 150 DEV) rural unpaved intersections, type of 
control has negligible effect on safety performance.  
•	 Overuse of stop control in low volume urban locations does not appear to 
adversely affect safety performance, but more study is needed to verify. 
•	 For both STOP and uncontrolled ultra-low-volume rural intersections, older 
drivers exhibit a lower crash rate than on the general statewide system. 
•	 Additional STOP sign use at these intersections does not appear to adversely 
affect safety performance.  
•	 Several references were found for conversion of all-way to two-way stop 
control, but guidelines for removal of two-way STOP signs have not been 
published. 
•	 If proper techniques and criteria are followed, it appears that rural agencies 
could remove or convert stop-controlled ultra-low-volume intersections 
without exposure to liability. 
xv 
INTRODUCTION 
Local agencies have been struggling with the increasing liability and the constant 
pressure to improve the efficiency of their stop-controlled intersections in order to lower 
not only agency costs, but user costs as well. Many of these rural two-way STOP signs 
are installed based on policy or general procedure, or an engineering study of geometric 
and operational factors. Others may have been installed in response to citizen complaints 
or studies that were conducted when traffic volumes may have been greater or sight 
distances less than they are today. These locations may no longer warrant the use of a 
STOP sign. For the purpose of this report, excessive stop control is defined as stop 
control beyond that required by sight distance or volume. An ultra-low-volume 
intersection is defined in this study as any intersection with a daily entering volume less 
than or equal to 150 vehicles. If the excessive use of stop control is negatively (or not) 
correlated with intersection performance, removal or change to less restrictive control 
(YIELD signs) may present an opportunity for improved operations, reduced 
maintenance costs and liability, and safety through increased respect for remaining 
control. 
Problem statement 
In Iowa, from 2001 to 2003, the major cause of about 20 percent of all fatal crashes on 
secondary roads was "ran STOP sign" and "FTYROW from STOP sign." However, 
excessive stop control is expensive to maintain, a potential liability, and may cause a 
reduction of respect for all signs. The expense of maintenance and enforcement in rural 
areas is particularly challenging. With an estimated 50,000 or more STOP signs on 
county roads in the State of Iowa, unnecessary signs also cost local governments 
thousands of dollars per year in maintenance and can represent a potential legal liability if 
inadequate maintenance or placement of signage is found to be a contributing factor in a 
crash. One city in Illinois spends up to $50 per year per STOP sign on maintenance and 
inspection (46). This cost does not represent the tort liability potential caused by signs 
that are not properly maintained. Pocahontas County estimates there may be more than 50 
STOP signs that might safely be removed, mainly because sight distances have been 
improved sometime after their installation (e.g., a grove of trees has been removed). “A 
1988 field survey of traffic signs in a major metropolitan area found that 60 percent of the 
locations surveyed needed to have some form of sign maintenance—either replacement 
of a sign, re-erection of a sign that was missing, removal of a sign that was unnecessary, 
or installation of a sign that was needed” (47). A different study of tort claims in which a 
fatality or serious injury occurred found that signing deficiencies were cited as the factor 
in 41 percent of the claims (47). 
It is generally held that unnecessary STOP signs lead to disregard by motorists, 
potentially creating hazardous conditions at locations where the control is actually 
warranted. In fact, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) (32) states 
that regulatory and warning signs should be used conservatively, as unnecessary signs do 
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not command attention. However, while commonly regarded as an important factor, the 
effect of excessive use of stop control on disrespect has not been quantified.  
The MUTCD presents specific guidance to assist agencies in selecting an appropriate 
level of traffic control at intersections, including stop, yield, and signal control. Although, 
the MUTCD presents specific criteria for the removal of traffic signals, no criteria are 
listed for the removal of STOP signs or change to less restrictive control. Further, no 
studies to date compare the performance of ultra-low-volume stop-controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections.  
As budgets are constrained and traffic conditions change, especially in rural jurisdictions, 
local agencies wish to optimize available resources and maintain or increase safety and 
level of service, while limiting or reducing exposure to tort liability claims. Changing 
low-volume rural intersections to less restrictive forms of control may be one way in 
which to respond efficiently to increasingly scarce resources, as well as reduced traffic 
flow or improved sight distance in some areas. This study investigated the effectiveness 
of rural stop control with the goal of developing warrants that can be used to support 
engineering decisions made by county and small city street superintendents to reduce or 
eliminate unnecessary control.  The safety performance of intersections with and without 
STOP signs was compared using statistical techniques to adjust for volume differences. 
Results are intended to serve as a first step in the development of guidance and 
procedures for elimination of unnecessary control. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this study are framed by the following questions: 
1.	 What documentation, guidelines, and current research address removal or change 
to less restrictive control? 
2.	 Adjusted for volumes, is there any difference in crash performance of 
uncontrolled versus stop-controlled ultra-low-volume intersections? Do certain 
driver groups (older or younger) have particular problems at rural stop-controlled 
or uncontrolled intersections, and are certain types of crashes more or less 
prevalent at those locations? 
3.	 Can a factor to represent the excessive use of STOP signs be developed to 
quantify the effect of STOP sign disrespect? Is compliance affected by the 
excessive use of STOP signs? Can a combination of volume, excessive use, and 
terrain be used to improve models of the effectiveness of stop control at low-
volume intersections? 
4.	 As data collection for sight distance of thousands of intersections is cost 

prohibitive, is it possible to develop a surrogate for the relative number of 
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intersections that would be expected to have sight distance limitations, based on 
county land cover and topography? 
5.	 Is there a defensible volume threshold for removal of stop control at ultra-low-
volume intersections? (Iowa specific “warrant”) 
6.	 What are the legal issues and operational procedures for removal of unnecessary 
stop control? 
Background/literature review 
Much research has been conducted on the safety effectiveness of all-way and two-way 
stop control. The Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) and the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) recommend applications (through the MUTCD) for the 
installation of stop control. Intended for urban settings, these applications may be 
questionable for rural use. Several studies are available that address rural and low-volume 
areas, as discussed below. 
Rural intersections 
Installation warrants 
There are two key references used for warrants regarding the installation of stop control: 
the MUTCD (32) and the ITE Traffic Control Devices Handbook (13). However, neither 
of these documents provides warrants for the removal of STOP signs (The National 
Committee for Uniform Traffic Control Devices is currently considering proposed 
language for the MUTCD that would base the application of two-way stops on combined 
vehicular, pedestrian, and bicycle volume [43]). The MUTCD calls for multi-way STOP 
signs at intersections with high speeds, sight distance issues, or a crash problem 
(indicated by five or more reported crashes in a twelve-month period that are susceptible 
to correction by a multi-way STOP installation), but does not include a volume warrant. 
Instead, it includes a warrant based upon the average volume for both the major and 
minor roadway over an eight-hour period during the day. This warrant states that a STOP 
sign should be considered at a location where the vehicular volume entering the 
intersection from the major street (total of both approaches) averages at least 300 vehicles 
per hour for any eight hours of an average day, and the combined vehicular, pedestrian, 
and bicycle volume entering the intersection from the minor street (total of both 
approaches) averages at least 200 units per hour for the same eight hours, with an average 
delay to minor street vehicular traffic of at least thirty seconds per vehicle during the 
highest hour. 
The FHWA conducted a study in 1981 in an attempt to establish definitive criteria for the 
application of two-way stop or yield control at low-volume intersections (27). After 
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completing an analysis of variance, the researchers observed a significant increase in 
crash experience when the volume on the major roadway reached 2,000 vehicles per day.  
Lum and Stockton (20) agreed and concluded that, up to a volume of 6,000 vehicles on 
the major roadway, a YIELD or STOP sign may be used to assign the right-of-way at an 
intersection. They also stated that it was not clear that the 6,000-vehicle volume level was 
the upper boundary of the region for which no relationship was evident between crashes 
and volume.  
The ITE Traffic Control Devices Handbook (TCDH) discourages the use of multi-way 
STOP signs unless the volumes on the major and minor roadways are approximately 
equal. The handbook also states that the MUTCD warrants should be the main criteria 
used to determine the locations for STOP signs. 
In several studies, Stokes (28, 29) advocates STOP sign warrants based on available sight 
distance and crash history. He contends that the majority of crashes associated with rural 
stop-controlled intersections are not caused by STOP sign violations, rather, the driver’s 
inability to judge distances adequately. Preston and Storm completed a study in which 
they also observed that the most common type (60%) of right angle crash at rural thru-
stop-controlled intersections in the state of Minnesota involved a vehicle stopping and 
then pulling out into an unsafe gap (36). Stokes concludes that effective solutions to the 
failure to yield problem should focus on the intersection as a whole rather than simply 
improving the sight distance or other characteristics of one leg of the intersection. He 
suggests the use of speed zones and advanced warning signs where drivers on the side 
road may have difficulty judging the speeds of approaching vehicles. Table 1 presents 
Stokes’ recommendation for control based on available sight distance, crash history 
(three years worth of data), and the major roadway volume. A note attached to the chart 
indicates that the values should be used in conjunction with MUTCD criteria when 
assessing the need for stop or yield control. It should be noted that while many 
intersections are stop controlled, volumes at Iowa rural unpaved intersections are 
typically an order of magnitude lower than the cutoff values recommended by Stokes. 
Table 1. Stokes’ method for determining control type 
Sight Distance Crash History (Last three years) 
Major Roadway Volume 
<= 2000 vpd > 2000 vpd 
0 No control YIELD 
Adequate <= 2 YIELD 3 STOP* 
4+ STOPNot Adequate Not applicable 
*If minor roadway volume is greater than 300 vpd, YIELD control is appropriate for intersections 
with less than four crashes in three years. Note: The material in this table is intended to be used in 
conjunction with appropriate MUTCD criteria in assessing the need for STOP or YIELD control. 
Several studies have been completed on the impact of sight distance on the safety of stop-
controlled intersections. Stockton (27) concluded that region, location, and geometry 
have an essentially negligible effect on safety and operations at low-volume intersections. 
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The report recommended that major roadway volume should be the principal factor in the 
determination of control type and that sight distance has no significant impact on the 
number of crashes that occur at an intersection. Mounce (22) completed a study in which 
he agrees with Stockton indicating that the choice of control should be strictly based upon 
the volume of the major roadway only, as long as the available sight distance is greater 
than the minimum required. Mounce recommended that no control be used on an 
intersection with a major roadway volume between zero and 2,000 vehicles, yield control 
be used with a major roadway volume between 2,000 and 5,000 vehicles, and stop 
control be used with a major roadway volume greater than 5,000 vehicles.  
Although Stockton and Mounce do not advocate use of sight distance to determine 
control type, it should be noted that there are at least two sight distance methods 
commonly used in the traffic engineering industry. One was included in the Traffic 
Control Devices Handbook (TCDH) published by the U. S. Department of Transportation 
(USDOT) Federal Highway Administration in 1983 (40). However, this method was not 
included in the handbook when it was updated in 2001 (13). The second can be found in 
A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets 2001 Fourth Edition, published 
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
(38). As stated in the TCDH method, “the decision as to whether to use a STOP sign or a 
YIELD sign is primarily based upon sight distance at the intersection” (13). The method 
uses a “critical approach speed” which is defined as the lowest speed that a motorist 
would be able to travel and still not be able to avoid a collision with an approaching 
vehicle on the cross street. 
“Critical approach speeds” are determined through the use of available sight distance, the 
allowance of parking, and a nomograph. An intersection with a critical approach speed of 
less than 10 miles per hour (mph) is controlled by a STOP sign. An intersection where 
the critical approach speed is between 10 mph and 15 mph may be controlled with a 
YIELD sign. If the critical approach speed on all approaches is above 15 mph, then the 
intersection can be uncontrolled. 
The TCDH assumes that motorists approaching uncontrolled intersections reduce their 
speed to account for prevailing conditions at the intersection. Consequently, the use of 
this method can result in a number of intersections remaining uncontrolled. Therefore, 
this method can be useful in urban areas. When Mounce refers to sight distance, he is 
using the TCDH method. 
The AASHTO method assumes that motorists approaching uncontrolled intersections 
reduce their speed by 50% based on observations. The method uses this assumption to 
determine the length of sight distance that is necessary along each leg of the intersecting 
roadway resulting in a desirable sight distance triangle. If this sight distance triangle 
exists, then no control is needed. If it does not exist, then control is needed. This method 
can also be adjusted for grades and tends to be more suited for rural areas. Use of this 
method almost always results in control being installed. 
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Mounce and Stockton (41) stated that “one of the major criteria for the application of 
intersection control on low-volume rural roads is the economic justifiability of such 
control.” They considered the probability that any two vehicles would enter an 
intersection within three seconds of each other resulting in a conflict. As a result of their 
calculations, they prepared the following table. 
Table 2. Expected number of crashes based on ADT 
ADT–Facility A 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
A
D
T 
- F
ac
ili
ty
 B
 
50 0.022 0.043 0.065 0.087 0.109 0.13 0.151 0.172 
100 0.043 0.087 0.13 0.174 0.216 0.259 0.301 0.345 
150 0.065 0.13 0.195 0.259 0.324 0.388 0.452 0.516 
200 0.087 0.174 0.259 0.345 0.432 0.516 0.602 0.686 
250 0.109 0.216 0.324 0.432 0.538 0.644 0.751 0.856 
300 0.13 0.259 0.388 0.516 0.644 0.772 0.899 1.026 
350 0.151 0.301 0.452 0.602 0.751 0.899 1.048 1.194 
400 0.172 0.345 0.516 0.686 0.856 1.026 1.194 1.363 
As can be seen from Table 2, intersections with less than 700 entering vehicles per day 
are expected to have less than one crash per year. This table was made using the 
following assumptions: 
•	 “Conflict” is defined as that maneuver of vehicle B such that the driver of vehicle 
A must change speed or direction to avoid collision 
•	 Average speed is 40 mph 
•	 Any two vehicles approaching the intersection from conflicting directions such 
that the second vehicle would enter the intersection within three seconds after the 
first vehicle enters the intersection are said to be in “conflict” 
•	 Effects of sight distance are not considered 
•	 All vehicles arrive during a twelve-hour period from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
•	 All arrivals follow a Poisson distribution 
•	 The possibility of vehicles arriving on three approaches within a three-second 
interval is negated 
•	 The probability of an accident occurring is thirty-three in one hundred thousand 
conflicts (42), or 0.00033 
Effectiveness of stop and yield control 
Lum and Stockton (20) conducted a study in which they investigated the relative 
effectiveness of STOP and YIELD signs at low-volume intersections (less than 500 
vehicles/day on minor roadway) in rural and urban environments. One of the major 
hypotheses that Lum and Stockton tested was that, at the 140 intersections involved in the 
study, STOP signs were used at intersections where sight distance was poor. This 
hypothesis was not supported by data, and the researchers concluded that stop control at 
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low-volume intersections is used in spite of adequate sight distance, and uncontrolled 
intersections are as likely to have poor sight distance. Lum and Stockton also tested the 
hypothesis that stop compliance increased as sight distance decreased. The researchers 
observed more than 3,000 movements and concluded that drivers would slow to whatever 
speed required to evaluate the safety of entering the intersection before choosing a course 
of action. This led Lum and Stockton to conclude that the current use of STOP signs is 
unrelated to sight distance availability. This behavior was consistent across all levels of 
sight distance and control type. 
Dyar (9) completed a similar study in which he researched drivers’ compliance with 
STOP signs at rural and urban intersections in South Carolina. Dyar noticed a compliance 
rate of 11% and that there was no significant difference in drivers’ observance of STOP 
signs with or without special control measures (larger STOP signs, STOP signs placed on 
both the right and left sides of the road, combination of red flashers and STOP signs used 
for traffic control, etc.) at rural intersections with inadequate sight distance. Lum and 
Stockton commented that these low compliance rates indicate STOP signs are being used 
indiscriminately; hence, the sign’s purpose of providing for orderly and predictable 
movement of traffic is defeated. Further, Lum and Stockton stated that it is evident that 
STOP signs have lost their meaning because drivers treat it as a YIELD sign instead: 
drivers slow and proceed through the intersection with caution. The study also concluded 
that many STOP signs at low-volume intersections are unjustified (although warranted by 
the MUTCD) and could be replaced by YIELD signs without increasing crash experience. 
The authors feel that this use of YIELD signs would restore the respect and effectiveness 
of STOP signs and improve operating efficiency.  
The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MNDOT) completed a study in 1998 in 
which the crash experiences at low-volume intersections in the state of Minnesota were 
examined to determine conclusions concerning the application of stop-controlled, yield-
controlled, and uncontrolled intersections (5). Out of the three types of intersections 
studied, the intersections with stop control had the fewest number of crashes over the 
study period. Because of this finding, MNDOT suggested that crash experience is an 
important aspect in the determination of type of control to be used at an intersection. 
Specifically, the report concluded that uncontrolled intersections with more than three 
crashes in three years (associated with right-of-way) be studied to determine whether 
more control was needed. However, Lum and Stockton (20) concluded that the 
conversion to stop control at low-volume intersections does not categorically help to 
reduce crashes because crashes at those locations are rare events.  
McGee and Blankenship (21) studied 765 urban intersections to determine effects of stop 
and yield controls. They concluded that crashes can increase when stop control is 
converted to yield control, but severity remains unaffected. Operating cost reductions will 
offset increased crash effects at lower volumes. The researchers recommended that 
adequate sight distance requirements should be met when establishing yield control. 
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Urban intersections 
Many cities have installed all-way stop-controlled intersections in residential areas in an 
attempt to reduce speed or provide extra safety for children in the area (10). These 
installations do not meet the warrants of the MUTCD (32), which states that STOP signs 
should not be installed for speed control. It is this misuse of traffic control devices that 
may promote a lack of respect for all traffic control devices and, therefore, decrease 
driver compliance with all such devices (10). There are studies that condemn the use of 
all-way stop control to reduce speeds in residential areas (16, 24, and 33). These studies 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of STOP signs for speed control, and one of these studies 
(33) states that mid-block speeds actually increase between signs.  
Comparison of two-way and four-way stop control 
Eck and Biega (10) completed a study that assists in resolving the conflicting opinions 
and research results existing about two-way versus four-way stop control at low-volume 
intersections in residential areas. The researchers found three low-volume intersections in 
a residential area in Star City, West Virginia, that were controlled by two-way STOP 
signs during the winter months and converted to four-way control during the summer 
months. This had been common practice in this community for many years to provide 
extra safety for children in the summer. Since the site conditions and traffic volumes at 
the intersections remained constant, the differences in the data obtained during the winter 
months (two-way stop control) and summer months (all-way stop control) could be 
directly attributed to the type of control used at that time.  
The mean speeds at mid-block were measured for all four directions in both conditions. 
After the conversion to all-way stop control, the mean speed on the north-south streets 
decreased from 23.0 to 21.9 miles per hour and on the east-west streets from 18.6 to 18.3 
miles per hour. These differences were not statistically significant; therefore, the mean 
speeds on the major and minor approaches were relatively unaffected by the use of two-
way and four-way stop controls. 
The fraction of non-stopping drivers increased from 14.1 percent during the two-way stop 
control to 25.1 percent after the conversion to an all-way stop control. The fraction of 
drivers who practically stopped (zero to three mph) decreased from 65.7 percent to 55.8 
percent after the conversion. 
The total user cost for each type of control was calculated as well using the default values 
from AASHTO Red Book (39). The installation of all-way stop control resulted in an 
average annual road user cost increase of $2,400 per intersection. The analysis led to the 
conclusion that the use of two-way stop control was three and a half times more efficient 
economically than the use of all-way stop control. 
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Effectiveness of multi-way stop control 
Bretherton (37) completed a study in which he reviewed over seventy technical 
documents concerning all-way stops (or multi-way stops) and their successes and failures 
as traffic control devices in residential areas. He studied twenty-three hypotheses using 
multi-way stops as speed control, and the research found additional nine hypotheses that 
tested the effect multi-way stops have on other traffic engineering problems. 
After the research had been completed, Bretherton concluded that multi-way STOP signs 
do not control speed except under very limited conditions. The research determined that 
the concerns about unwarranted STOP signs are well founded. Below are some of the 
conclusions of Bretherton’s research: 
1.	 Multi-way stops do not control speeds. (23 references) 
2.	 Stop compliance is poor at unwarranted multi-way STOP signs. An unwarranted 
STOP is defined as a STOP sign which does not meet the warrants of the 
MUTCD. Drivers do not stop because they feel that the signs have no traffic 
control purpose. Drivers believe there is little reason to yield the right-of-way 
when there are usually no vehicles on the minor street. (19 references) 
3.	 Before and after studies show multi-way STOP signs do not reduce speeds on 
residential streets. (4 references) 
4.	 Unwarranted multi-way stops increased speed some distance from intersections. 
These studies hypothesize that motorists are making up the time they lost at the 
"unnecessary" STOP sign. (17 references) 
5.	 Multi-way STOP signs have high operating costs based on vehicle operating 
costs, vehicular travel times, fuel consumption, and increased vehicle emissions. 
(15 references) 
6.	 Safety of pedestrians, especially small children, is decreased at unwarranted 
multi-way stops. It seems that pedestrians expect vehicles to stop at the STOP 
signs, but many vehicles have gotten in the habit of running the "unnecessary" 
STOP sign. (13 references) 
7.	 Citizens feel safer in communities that are "positively controlled" by STOP signs. 
Positively controlled is meant to infer that the streets are controlled by 
unwarranted (possibly unnecessary) STOP signs. Homeowners on the residential 
collector feel safer on a “calmed” street. (7 references) Hypothesis eleven (below) 
lists five references that dispute the results of these studies.  
8.	 Speeding problems on residential streets are not associated with "through" traffic. 
Homeowners feel the problem is created by “outsiders.” Frequently, the driver 
who is speeding through the neighborhood is the person complaining. (5 
references) 
9.	 Unwarranted multi-way stops may present potential liability problems for 
undocumented exceptions to accepted warrants. Local jurisdictions feel they may 
be incurring higher liability exposure by “violating” the MUTCD. Many times, 
the unwarranted STOP signs are installed without a warrant study or some 
documentation. (6 references) 
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10. The costs of installing multi-way stops are low, but enforcement costs are 
prohibitive. Many communities do not have the resources to effectively enforce 
compliance with the STOP signs. (5 references) 
11. STOP signs do not significantly change the safety of an intersection. STOP signs 
are installed with the hope that they will make the intersection and neighborhood 
safer. (5 references) Hypothesis seven (above) lists seven references that dispute 
the results of these studies. 
12. Unwarranted multi-way stops have been successfully removed with public 
support and result in improved compliance at justified STOP signs. (3 references) 
13. Unwarranted multi-way stops reduce crashes in cities with intersection sight 
distance problems and at intersections where parked cars restrict sight distance. 
The STOP signs are unwarranted based on volume and do not meet the crash 
threshold. (3 references) 
14. Citizens feel STOP signs should be installed at locations based on traffic 
engineering studies. Some homeowners realize the importance of installing 
“needed” STOP signs. (2 references) 
15. Multi-way stops can reduce cut-through traffic volume if many intersections 
along the road are controlled by STOP signs. If enough STOP signs are installed 
on a residential or collector street, motorists may use a different route because of 
the inconvenience of having to start and stop at so many intersections. This 
includes many drivers who will not stop but slowly “cruise” through the STOP 
signs. This driving behavior has been nicknamed the “California cruise.” (2 
references) 
16. Special police enforcement of multi-way STOP signs has limited effectiveness. 
This has been called the “halo” effect. Drivers will obey the “unreasonable” laws 
as long as a policeman is visible. (2 references) 
17. District judges order the removal of STOP signs not installed in compliance with 
city ordinance. Judges have ordered the conversion of “unnecessary” all-way 
stop-controlled intersections to two-way stop-controlled intersections. The 
problem begins when the traffic engineer and/or elected officials are asked to 
consider their intersection a “special case”. This creates a precedent and results in 
a proliferation of “special case” all-way STOP signs. (2 references) 
18. Some jurisdictions have created warrants for multi-way stops that are easier to 
meet than those outlined in the MUTCD. These jurisdictions feel that the MUTCD 
warrants are too difficult to meet in residential areas. The reduced warrants are 
usually created to please elected officials. (2 references) 
19. Citizens perceive STOP signs as effective methods of speed control because 
traffic "slows" at a STOP sign. If everybody obeyed the traffic laws, STOP signs 
would reduce speeds on residential streets. (1 reference) 
20. Removal of multi-way STOP signs does not change speeds, but speeds are 
slightly lower without the STOP signs. These findings support the drivers’ 
behavior referenced in item four (above) which stated that speed increases when 
unwarranted STOP signs are installed. Speed decreases when the STOP signs 
were removed. (1 reference) 
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Urban stop warrants 
Many civil engineers use basic traffic engineering principles to argue against the policies 
of the MUTCD (32). As vehicles at all-way stops alternate the right-of-way, all-way stops 
function better at locations where vehicle conflicts occur frequently and the traffic 
volumes on the major and minor roads are approximately equal. All-way stops also 
function well at locations where there have been many correctable right-angle-type 
crashes or where unusual circumstances exist. However, all-way stops should only be 
placed where necessary since drivers may disregard STOP signs that they deem to be 
“unnecessary” due to traffic, pedestrian volume, or limited visibility. The installation of 
unwarranted STOP signs can create excessive delay and fuel use as well. 
The City of San Diego was an innovator in the creation of an all-way stop policy. The 
City created its first alternative to the national policy in 1962. The City’s newest policy 
consists of five warrants and a point system. All-way stops may be justified at 
intersections with twenty-five or more points. The point system can be waived and all-
way stops can be justified under any of the following special provisions: 
1.	 Five or more crashes susceptible to correction by all-way stops have occurred in a 
twelve-month period. 
2.	 Traffic signals are warranted and not yet installed. 
3.	 The intersection has an extreme combination of unusual conditions, and 
engineering judgment determines that the location would be best served by all-
way stops. 
The five warrants and corresponding point values are as follows: 
1.	 Crash experience—maximum fifteen points. Three points are assigned for each 
correctable crash that occurred in the preceding twelve-month period. 
2.	 Unusual conditions (parking in the vicinity, sight distance issues, etc.)— 
maximum five points. Points are assigned for unusual conditions based on 
engineering judgment. The point value assigned to each condition should be 
correlated to the improvement that all-way stops would provide. When awarding 
points in this warrant, it is important to consider only the actual benefits that all-
way stops provide, not the perceived benefits attributed to all-way stops by many 
non-professionals. Speed control should never be a basis for awarding points. 
3.	 Traffic volumes—maximum fifteen points. Two tables, one for the minor street 
and one for the major street, are used to assign points based on volume. For the 
minor street, the number of points awarded increases as the volume increases up 
to a maximum of ten points. For the major street, the maximum of five points is 
assigned to a range of volumes at which all-way stops function best. 
4.	 Traffic volume difference—maximum ten points. This warrant differs from the 
“traffic volumes” warrant in that it considers only the difference between the four-
hour volumes of the two streets. All-way stops function best when the difference 
between the volumes is small. 
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5.	 Pedestrian volumes—maximum five points. The volume of pedestrians crossing 
the major street is of concern when evaluating for all-way stops. One point is 
assigned for each set of fifty pedestrians in four hours. 
The City of San Diego used twenty-three all-way stop intersections to evaluate the 
capability of this new policy to select intersections that perform well with all-way stops. 
All twenty-three of these intersections had all-way stops installed despite not meeting the 
criteria of the old policy. These intersections were then re-evaluated using the criteria of 
the new policy with data from the original evaluation. If the new policy had been in effect 
at the time these intersections were originally evaluated, only fourteen of the twenty-three 
intersections would have had an all-way stop installed. The fourteen intersections that 
met the criteria were placed in Group A and the remaining nine that did not meet the 
criteria were placed in Group B for evaluation. 
An analysis of all the crashes that occurred twelve months before and after the 
installation was completed. Group A experienced a significant reduction, whereas Group 
B experienced a slight increase in crashes. However, the increase of Group B was not 
statistically significant.  
Group A had an average volume ratio (major roadway volume to minor roadway volume) 
of 1.8, whereas Group B had an average of 4.0. These data support the idea that all-way 
stops function better with volumes that are approximately equal. Group A also had a 
lower fraction of motorists on the major street who failed to stop than Group B (6.8 
percent to 13.0 percent). The difference between these two figures is statistically 
significant at the five percent level. 
After the completion of the analysis, the research team determined that the new policy 
was effective at selecting the intersections where an all-way stop is warranted and will 
earn the respect of the motorists so that it will have a better rate of STOP sign 
compliance. 
The MUTCD and the ITE Traffic Control Devices Handbook are the major references for 
the installation of all-way and two-way stops. Several researchers have found reasons for 
the modification of these warrants, but each researcher comes to a different conclusion on 
how the warrants should be modified. There remains no list of volume warrants for the 
installation or removal of stop control in the rural or urban setting.  
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SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION 
A survey was conducted to investigate county policy or practice in Iowa related to the 
installation and removal of STOP signs at rural ultra-low-volume intersections. Data was 
then collected to support analyses comparing the safety performance of controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections and county safety performance based on the prevalence of stop 
control. 
Survey 
The survey was sent to all ninety-nine Iowa county engineers. (The survey can be seen in 
the Appendix.) Respondents were asked about the following: 
•	 The number of uncontrolled intersections, all-way stops, and yield-controlled 
intersections on county roads 
•	 Criteria used for installation of STOP signs 
•	 The use of engineering studies prior to installation 
•	 The existence of formal or general policy for STOP sign usage (e.g., place a 
STOP sign at all intersections, only intersections with sight distance issues, only 
intersections with paved roadways). 
Twenty-nine counties responded to the survey. Below is a summary of responses. 
1.	 Five counties have no rural uncontrolled intersections, while eleven counties have 
more than 200 uncontrolled intersections. No county has paved or paved/unpaved 
uncontrolled intersections. 
2.	 Three counties have no all-way rural stop intersections. Three counties have more 
than fifty all-way stop intersections and two of these have more than 100 all-way 
stop intersections. Twenty-three of the twenty-six counties with all-way rural stop 
intersections stated that at least one of these intersections is a paved or 
paved/unpaved intersection. 
3.	 Twelve counties have no yield-controlled rural intersections. Four of them 

indicated that they will not consider the use of YIELD signs. 

4.	 The most common major criteria considered by county engineers before installing 
stop control at an intersection is crash experience (twenty-five counties), followed 
by sight distance (twenty-three counties) (See Figure 1).  
5.	 Fourteen counties have no formal policy or procedure for installing stop control at 
intersections. Eleven counties have an informal policy which generally consists of 
an investigation of crash history and available sight distance, public input, or the 
completion of an engineering study. The other four counties did not respond. 
6.	 Eighteen counties always perform an engineering study prior to installing STOP 
signs, while one county never performs an engineering study prior to installation. 
7.	 The two most popular references used in support of engineering studies are the 
MUTCD (twenty-eight counties) and the Iowa Department of Transportation 
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(Iowa DOT) guidelines (twelve counties). No county indicated the use of ITE 
procedures to perform an engineering study. 
Figure 1. Criteria used by county engineers before installing stop control 
The survey indicated that the two most popular criteria considered by county engineers 
before the installation of a STOP sign were available sight distance and crash history. 
There were no counties that specified the use of volume as an indicator for STOP sign 
usage and that had a formal policy for the installation of a STOP sign. Instead, counties 
followed the guidelines outlined in the MUTCD and those used by the Iowa DOT. 
Data collection 
Along with the responses to the survey, nineteen counties sent either a map or a database 
identifying the locations of their rural STOP signs. Several of the databases that were sent 
contained several thousand records of every sign (regulatory, warning, and guide signs) 
in the county. These databases were assembled to determine the locations of all stop- and 
yield-controlled intersections for each county. Next, each stop- or yield-controlled 
intersection was manually selected from a GIS layer of all intersections in the state of 
Iowa. After the intersections for a county had been selected, a map of the county was 
created identifying the control type of each intersection.  
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After the study intersections had been selected, a crash analysis was conducted using ten 
years of crash data (1994-2003). Intersection-related crashes were selected using a GIS 
program. Only multi-vehicle crashes were identified as intersection crashes. Further, 
crashes more than 150 feet from the intersections were excluded from consideration (150 
feet is the standard distance used by the Iowa DOT for rural and urban intersection crash 
identification). A spatial “join” was then completed to assign each crash to the nearest 
intersection. After the daily entering vehicles (DEV) for each intersection had been 
calculated, the average number of crashes, crash rate, average severity loss, and cost per 
intersection was computed and summarized for each county and stratified by number of 
intersection legs as well as by type of control. All costs were determined using standard 
values for crash severity used by the Iowa DOT. 
An example county summary is shown in Table 3. The table shows that stop-controlled 
intersections had a much higher average crash rate per million entering vehicles than 
uncontrolled intersections in Story County. Stop-controlled intersections also had a 
higher average number of crashes per intersection, as well as a lower average severity 
cost per intersection. However, there were only twelve stop-controlled intersections as 
compared to nearly 320 uncontrolled intersections in this county.  
Table 3. Summary for Story County 
Unpaved – Unpaved Intersections – Story County (values per intersection) 
3 leg intersections 4 leg intersections 
Uncontrolled Stop-controlled Uncontrolled Stop-controlled 
Avg MEV rate 0.30 0.30 1.06 1.94 
Avg DEV 86 93 88 115 
Avg crashes 0.09 0.20 0.33 0.57 
Avg sev 0.15 0.40 0.73 1.14 
Avg sev cost $1,270 $500 $20,344 $3,571 
Number of int 156 5 160 7 
Max rate 24.35 1.52 9.13 7.83 
Max DEV 395 180 435 255 
Min DEV 18 25 25 35 
Max crashes 4 1 4 1 
Max sev cost $150,000 $2,500 $1,000,000 $10,000 
Total crashes 14 1 52 4 
Pooled Data 
Uncontrolled Stop-controlled All data 
Avg MEV rate 0.68 1.26 0.71 
Avg DEV 87 106 88 
Avg crashes 0.21 0.42 0.22 
Avg sev 0.44 0.83 0.45 
Avg sev cost $10,926 $2,292 $10,489 
Number of int 316 12 332 
Max rate 24.35 7.83 24.35 
Max DEV 435 255 435 
Min DEV 18 25 18 
Max crashes 4 1 4 
Max sev cost $1,000,000 $10,000 $1,000,000 
Total crashes 66 5 72 
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As shown in Table 4, statewide stop-controlled intersections have a lower average crash 
rate, average severity cost, total number of crashes, and an average cost per crash than 
uncontrolled intersections. The average number of crashes per intersection is 
approximately equal for stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections.  
Table 4. Unpaved Intersection Crash Performance, Nineteen Counties 
3 leg intersections 4 leg intersections 
Uncontrolled Stop-controlled Uncontrolled Stop-controlled 
Avg. rate (MEV) 0.17 0.14 0.50 0.36 
Avg. DEV 67 80 69 94 
Avg. crashes 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.14 
Avg. severity 0.08 0.07 0.33 0.29 
Avg. sev. cost $836 $291 $12,470 $8,370 
Number of int. 2268 1373 1561 1607 
Max rate 24.35 13.70 18.26 10.96 
Max DEV 465 440 443 455 
Min DEV 8 8 15 10 
Max crashes 4 2 4 4 
Max sev. cost $150,000 $150,000 $1,150,000 $1,020,000 
Total crashes 99 62 205 217 
Avg. rate (MEV) 
Avg. DEV 
Avg. crashes 
Avg. severity 
Avg. sev. cost 
Number of int. 
Max rate 
Max DEV 
Min DEV 
Max crashes 
Avg. cost/crash 
Total crashes 
Pooled data for all 3 & 4 leg intersections All data 
Pooled 
0.28 
77 
0.09 
0.18 
$5,171 
6809 
24.35 
465 
8 
4 
583 
Uncontrolled 
0.31 
68 
0.08 
0.18 
$5,578 
3829 
24.35 
465 
8 
4 
$70,265 
304 
Stop-controlled 
0.26 
88 
0.09 
0.19 
$4,648 
2980 
13.70 
455 
8 
4 
$49,645 
279 
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ANALYSIS 
The following sections discuss the analyses completed in this study. An analysis of safety 
performance (stop versus uncontrolled) and a cost analysis were completed. A regression 
analysis was conducted to determine whether a crash was more likely to occur at a 
specific intersection based on type of control and DEV. However, none of these analyses 
attempted to quantify the relationship between the widespread use of stop control and 
intersection safety performance. In order to quantify this relationship, three different 
analyses were completed: (1) the determination of “excess” control based only on a 
volume threshold, (2) the determination of “excess” control based on a volume threshold 
and the fraction of intersections that should be controlled due to sight distance limitations 
(approximated by a “terrain factor”), and (3) determination of a use factor based on the 
ratio of stop control used in a typical Iowa county (Cherokee County). These analyses led 
to the identification of a potential volume threshold for the use of stop control. Analyses 
were completed to determine older or younger drivers crash experiences at ultra-low-
volume rural unpaved intersections and whether specific types of crashes were more 
prevalent at study intersections. The analysis chapter concludes with a section outlining 
an urban application that was completed in the City of Ames, Iowa. 
Controlled versus uncontrolled intersections 
A descriptive statistical analysis was first conducted on 6,846 unpaved rural intersections. 
Fifty-six percent of the study intersections were uncontrolled (There was an insufficient 
number of rural yield-controlled intersections in the database to make any statistically 
significant conclusions regarding the use of YIELD signs. Therefore, yield control was 
not studied in depth in this project.). Ninety-two percent of the intersections had no 
crashes in ten years (approximately the same for both stop-controlled and uncontrolled 
intersections). The probability of one or more crashes at an intersection during the ten-
year period was then modeled as a function of DEV and type of control.  
Figure 2 shows all the intersections involved in the study with a DEV less than or equal 
to 100 vehicles. The vast majority of these intersections had no crashes during the ten-
year analysis period. Nearly 5,500 intersections had a DEV of less than 100 vehicles and 
over 5,000 of these intersections had no crashes. 
Figure 3 shows the same information for all the study intersections. The intersections 
were then classified into volume categories (see Table 5) and graphed in subsequent 
figures. 
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Figure 2. Intersections with DEV less than 100 vehicles 
Figure 3. All unpaved intersections 
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Table 5. Crash comparison by DEV range 
Stop-controlled Intersections 
Category DEV # of int Crashes Avg crashes/int Avg rate/int Avg sev/crash 
20 0-20 97 1 0.01 0.14 4.00 
40 21-40 452 8 0.02 0.14 2.88 
60 41-60 646 32 0.05 0.25 1.63 
80 61-80 581 39 0.07 0.26 2.23 
100 81-100 389 38 0.10 0.29 2.16 
120 101-120 250 30 0.12 0.29 1.93 
140 121-140 167 18 0.11 0.22 2.06 
160 141-160 109 24 0.22 0.40 1.79 
180 161-180 74 17 0.23 0.36 1.82 
200 181-200 51 15 0.29 0.42 1.67 
Uncontrolled Intersections 
Category DEV # of int Crashes Avg crashes/int Avg rate/int Avg sev/crash 
20 0-20 190 4 0.02 0.33 1.75 
40 21-40 872 29 0.03 0.27 2.28 
60 41-60 1091 51 0.05 0.25 2.24 
80 61-80 748 66 0.09 0.34 2.61 
100 81-100 373 47 0.13 0.38 2.15 
120 101-120 198 36 0.18 0.45 2.67 
140 121-140 122 21 0.17 0.36 2.10 
160 141-160 76 13 0.17 0.32 2.38 
180 161-180 49 11 0.22 0.36 1.91 
200 181-200 26 3 0.12 0.17 2.67 
Figure 4 shows that, as expected, as DEV increases, the average number of crashes per 
intersection increases. (Numbers above each bar in the figure indicate the number of 
intersections in that DEV category.) Generally speaking, uncontrolled intersections have 
more crashes per intersection below 160 DEV. 
Figure 5 indicates that as DEV increases for stop-controlled intersections, the average 
crash rate per intersection tends to increase as well. (Numbers above each bar in the 
figure indicate the number of intersections in that DEV category.) However, it appears as 
though no observable trend exists for the uncontrolled intersections. Here, again, the 
average crash rate for uncontrolled intersections tends to be higher below 160 DEV. 
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Figure 4. Average crashes vs. DEV 
Figure 5. Average crash rate per intersection vs. DEV category 
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Figure 6 shows that, generally, the average severities per crash for both stop-controlled 
and uncontrolled intersections are comparable. Uncontrolled intersections tend to have a 
somewhat higher average severity across all DEV categories, with the exception of the 
lowest DEV categories where sample size is very small. (Numbers above each bar in the 
figure indicate the number of crashes in that DEV category.) 
Figure 6. Average severity per crash vs. DEV category 
Figures 7 and 8 present the data points for each of the nineteen study area counties (one 
for stop-controlled intersections and one for uncontrolled intersections). The figures 
portray the average number of crashes and crash rate versus average DEV per 
intersection. Again, as expected, as DEV increases, the average number of crashes per 
intersection tends to increase as well for both control types. Above a DEV value of about 
60 vehicles per day, uncontrolled intersections have more crashes than their stop-
controlled counterparts. Figure 7 also appears to indicate that at DEV lower than the 
divergent point, the two types of control are approximately equal with respect to the 
average number of crashes per intersection. 
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Figure 7. Average number of crashes per intersection on a countywide basis 
Figure 8. Comparison of intersection performance 
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As shown in the previous figures, stop-controlled intersections tend to have a lower crash 
rate except at very ultra-low-volume locations (less than sixty DEV), where it appears as 
though the crash rates of both stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections are 
approximately equal. This may indicate that statistically there is no significant difference 
between the two types of control at any DEV less than this threshold value. 
Cost analysis 
Statewide, stop-controlled intersections have a slightly lower average crash rate per 
million entering vehicles as well as a lower average cost per crash. For these reasons, it 
would appear that there is a savings (excluding delay cost) which could be realized by 
switching all uncontrolled intersections to stop-controlled intersections. (The following 
calculation is made using numbers taken from Table 4.) 
Crashes saved by changing uncontrolled to stop-controlled intersections = (0.05 
(difference in crash rate) x 68 (average DEV) x 365 days x 10 years x 3,829 
intersections) / 1,000,000 = 47.5 crashes 
To calculate the expected savings, the cost of the crashes after the conversion (256 
crashes multiplied by the average cost per crash for stop-controlled intersections, 
$50,000) can be subtracted from the cost of the crashes before the conversion (304 
crashes multiplied by average cost per crash for uncontrolled intersections, $70,000). The 
savings would be approximately $8.5 million, not including the cost of installing and 
maintaining STOP signs. However, this analysis assumes that none of the stop-controlled 
intersections is warranted based on sight distance. A more realistic analysis would 
include crash, maintenance, and delay costs. Therefore, the following assumptions were 
made: 
•	 Vehicles slowed from fifty-five miles per hour to forty miles per hour at 
uncontrolled intersections and then accelerated to fifty-five miles per hour (delay 
of thirty seconds per vehicle from field tests completed by author) 
•	 Vehicles slowed from fifty-five miles per hour to a complete stop at stop-
controlled intersections and then accelerated to fifty-five miles per hour (delay of 
forty-five seconds per vehicle from field tests completed by author) 
•	 The cost per driver hour was fifteen dollars 
•	 All stop-controlled intersections are two-way stop intersections 
•	 Maintenance/replacement cost per year per intersection was fifty dollars 
The equations representing the regression curves on Figure 7 were used to calculate the 
number of crashes used in the cost analysis, resulting in the cost estimates presented in 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Total cost in ten years based on control type 
This figure indicates another divergent point near 250 entering vehicles. The inclusion of 
all costs in this analysis caused the divergent point to shift from a DEV near 70 vehicles 
(based solely on crashes) to a value of 250 vehicles. Presuming all of the above 
assumptions to be accurate, this graph indicates that stop-controlled intersections should 
not be used at intersections with a DEV lower than 250 vehicles based on total cost 
(crashes, maintenance, and delay). However, this analysis may overstate the benefits of 
the use of an uncontrolled intersection. Turning vehicles have to decelerate at an 
intersection regardless of control type, and turning movements may be prominent at study 
intersections due to the lack of thoroughfare at ultra-low-volume rural intersections. 
Therefore, this analysis may overstate the benefits of an uncontrolled intersection with 
respect to turning movements.  
Logistic regression 
A logistic regression was completed to quantify the relationship between type of control, 
DEV, and the probability of having at least one crash occur at an intersection over ten 
years (however, this analysis did not include sight distance). As the number of crashes 
was nearly always equal to zero or one, logistic regression was used to determine the 
probability that one or more crashes would occur at a specific intersection during the ten-
year period based on type of control and DEV (Sight distance is not included as a 
variable in this analysis. The DEV used in this analysis were collected by IDOT between 
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1960 and 2003.). For a binary variable, the appropriate model is the binomial which is 
fitted using logistic regression.  
Figure 10 shows the regression equation and resulting probabilities for all study 
intersections. Type of control was treated as a dummy variable (-1 for stop-controlled and 
+1 for uncontrolled intersections). A divergent point exists near a DEV equal to 100 
vehicles. It is at this point that uncontrolled intersections begin to have a higher 
probability of having at least one crash in a ten-year period. Below this point, however, it 
appears as though the probabilities for stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections are 
approximately equal. This may indicate a threshold value, below which the type of 
control is not statistically significant and may not matter because the intersection 
performance of stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections is approximately the same.  
A ninety-five percent confidence interval was determined for the location of the divergent 
point. The interval determined that this point lies between 66 and 140 daily entering 
vehicles. The correct interpretation of this interval is as follows: the interval from 66 to 
140 DEV covers the true DEV value at which there is no difference in the probability of a 
crash between intersections with and without stop control with ninety-five percent 
confidence. 
Figure 10. Probability of a crash occurring in ten years 
Effect of “positive” control 
Although statewide crash rates at stop-controlled intersections are lower than at 
uncontrolled intersections, it is overly simplistic to say that conversion of all intersections 
to stop control would result in a reduction of crashes. The procedure completed 
previously does not account for the potential of any underlying factors that may make the 
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previously uncontrolled intersections different from their controlled counterparts. 
Therefore, an analysis was completed in which the use of excess stop control was 
investigated. The fraction of stop-controlled intersections for each county was determined 
as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Fraction of stop-controlled intersections per county 
County 100 150 Total # of int # of stop-controlled int % controlled 
# of int meeting threshold 
Adams 17 4 361 252 70% 
Boone 60 18 379 94 25% 
Bremer 77 39 268 113 42% 
Calhoun 50 16 379 140 37% 
Carroll 144 46 401 245 61% 
Cedar 142 58 396 167 42% 
Cerro Gordo 89 23 359 208 58% 
Cherokee 33 9 350 93 27% 
Clay 40 10 332 49 15% 
Emmet 10 4 183 92 50% 
Henry 130 51 346 181 52% 
Madison 166 101 496 143 29% 
Montgomery 54 8 349 208 60% 
Osceola 19 4 219 98 45% 
Pocahontas 26 3 325 66 20% 
Sac 54 16 379 88 23% 
Story 98 33 328 12 4% 
Washington 151 61 483 398 82% 
Woodbury 125 81 489 368 75% 
This data was plotted against the average crash rate at all stop-controlled intersections for 
each county to determine the effect that positive control had on intersection performance 
(See Figure 11). 
It has been hypothesized that as the use of stop control at intersections increases, the 
crash rate (on a countywide basis) would increase as well (This hypothesis was used to 
validate the potential removal of several stop-controlled intersections.). Figure 11 shows 
that this phenomenon does not exist. It appears that the average crash rate would slightly 
decrease as the use of STOP signs increased. Because of the downward trend in these 
data, the fraction controlled was used to determine the existence of any correlations 
elsewhere within the data. 
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Figure 11. Effect of positive control on stop-controlled intersections crash rate 
Figure 12 shows the average crash rate for all intersections in each county versus the 
fraction of stop-controlled intersections. This figure also shows a slightly downward 
trend. It was hypothesized that this trend occurred because counties that had a low crash 
rate for all the unpaved intersections in the county also had a low crash rate for the entire 
county (all crashes along all unpaved roads in the county). The green points represent the 
crash rate for all the crashes that occurred along unpaved roads in the county (not just 
intersection crashes). As Figure 12 shows, these rates do not tend to decrease as fractional 
control increases. Therefore, the relationship between average crash rate (all unpaved 
intersections) and fraction controlled is not correlated with countywide crash rate. 
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Figure 12. Effect of positive control on countywide crash rate 
Figure 13. Non-linear effect of DEV and control on crash rate 
Figure 13 shows the average crash rate divided by the total DEV for all the unpaved 
intersections versus percent controlled. This figure was created to determine the nonlinear 
effect of DEV on the relationship between average crash rate and fraction controlled. 
Again, a downward trend appears to exist. 
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As shown in Table 7, a new variable, “percent excess” was calculated. This variable 
indicates fraction of additional intersections that each county has based on the assumption 
that all intersections that have at least 100 DEV should be controlled by use of a STOP 
sign. A DEV equal to 100 was selected based upon the logistic regression discussed 
previously. That regression showed that at a DEV near 100 vehicles, stop-controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections appeared to have the same value. Equation 1 shows the 
calculation of the “percent excess” variable. The trends shown in Figures 11 through 13 
do not support the hypothesis that crash rate increases as the use of stop control increases. 
For this reason, the effect of “excessive” use was studied next. 
Excessive control (based on volume threshold only) 
After determining that there was little apparent relationship between the stop control 
representation of a county and intersection crash performance, the next step was to 
determine if the use of excessive control (based on a volume threshold only) had an effect 
on intersection performance. To determine the amount of excessive use that each county 
had, a volume threshold was created to determine the number of intersections where stop 
control was valid based on volume alone. Again, this analysis did not take into account 
the number of intersections that were valid based on sight distance. This analysis focused 
strictly on volume validation. As shown in Figure 11, a DEV level of 100 vehicles 
appeared to be the point where uncontrolled intersection safety performance began to 
decline in comparison to that of its stop-controlled counterpart. For this reason, a 
validation volume of 100 DEV was chosen to determine the effect of excessive control. 
The following equation was used to calculate the percentage of excess stop-controlled 
intersections each county had based on a DEV threshold of 100 vehicles:  
Equation 1: Calculation of percent excess 
percent excess = (the number of stop-controlled 
intersections that exist minus the number of stop-controlled 
intersections that the county should have based on a DEV 
of 100) / the number of stop-controlled intersections that 
the county should have based on a DEV of 100 
Table 7 shows the “percent excess” calculated for each county based on a threshold value 
of 100 DEV. There are two counties with negative percentages: Madison and Story 
County. These numbers are negative because the number of intersections with at least 
100 DEV in these counties is greater than the number of stop-controlled intersections 
which exist in these counties. 
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Table 7. Percent excess calculated for each county 
County 
% "excess" 
assuming volume 
threshold = 100 
Total 
crashes 
Average 
crashes 
Avg 
rate 
Avg 
DEV 
Total 
DEV 
(1000s) 
Rate 
(crashes/MEV) 
Adams 1382% 9 0.02 0.10 61 22 4.5 
Boone 57% 58 0.15 0.45 108 41 11.1 
Bremer 47% 50 0.19 0.44 104 28 15.8 
Calhoun 180% 21 0.06 0.24 66 25 9.6 
Carroll 70% 49 0.12 0.31 94 38 8.2 
Cedar 18% 48 0.12 0.30 98 39 7.7 
Cerro Gordo 134% 27 0.08 0.24 85 31 7.9 
Cherokee 182% 21 0.06 0.32 60 21 15.2 
Clay 23% 29 0.09 0.37 64 21 17.4 
Emmet 820% 11 0.06 0.26 54 10 26.3 
Henry 39% 34 0.10 0.20 96 33 6.0 
Madison -14% 57 0.11 0.17 102 51 3.4 
Montgomery 285% 13 0.04 0.21 60 21 10.2 
Osceola 416% 11 0.05 0.25 57 12 20.0 
Pocahontas 154% 19 0.06 0.26 59 19 13.6 
Sac 63% 25 0.07 0.28 70 27 10.6 
Story -88% 72 0.22 0.71 88 29 24.6 
Washington 164% 34 0.07 0.20 87 42 4.8 
Woodbury 194% 40 0.08 0.27 96 47 5.8 
Figure 14 shows the relationship between the average crash rate for all study intersections 
in each county versus the fraction of excess stop-controlled intersections. It appears that 
as the fraction of excess stop-controlled intersections increases, the average crash rate per 
intersection (on a countywide basis) decreases. A correlation was completed to determine 
if there was an actual relationship between these two variables. 
The test statistic for a correlation is the p-value. A p-value less than or equal to 0.05 
indicates a strong relationship between two variables (at the ninety-five percent 
significance level). The correlation completed for these two variables indicated a p-value 
of 0.48. This value means that the fraction of excess stop-controlled intersections is not a 
strong indication of the average crash rate on a countywide basis. Since there was no 
strong relationship between these two variables, a factor to indicate the effect of excess 
use had to be calculated. This factor would not only include a volume threshold, but also 
a surrogate for sight distance on a countywide basis. 
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Figure 14. “Percent excess” STOP signs based on a volume threshold of 100 DEV 
Terrain factor 
Clearly, STOP sign overuse is not indicated at sites with sight distance limitations. 
However, as sight distance is not available in the Iowa DOT database and this project 
scoped to more than 6,000 locations, it was not feasible to collect sight distance for each 
intersection. In an attempt to account for the fraction of intersections that should be 
controlled due to sight distance, a terrain factor was developed. This factor was a 
surrogate for sight distance (It was assumed that counties with rougher terrain would 
have more sight distance limitations than a flat, crop-covered county.). The “percent 
excess” calculated previously (based on volume alone) was adjusted by this terrain factor 
in an attempt to more appropriately represent the effect of excess STOP sign use. The 
terrain factor was created based on topography and land cover on a county by county 
basis, based on United States Geological Survey (USGS) land cover and shaded relief 
maps. Each county was given a value of one to three (one = low, flat land, agriculture 
cover, three = high, river land, forest cover) based on topography and land cover. See 
Figures 15 through 17 below. 
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Figure 15. USGS land cover map 
Figure 16. USGS shaded relief map 
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Figure 17. Terrain values for each county 
“Justified” stop-controlled intersections based on volume and terrain 
To determine the number of “justified” stop-controlled intersections, two separate 
fractions were estimated. The first was the fraction of intersections that met the threshold 
value of 100 DEV (as outlined previously). The second was the fraction of intersections 
that would be warranted on sight distance limitations. As the terrain factor was somewhat 
subjectively determined, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the effect of a 
range of terrain values. 
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Table 8. Terrain factor values 
Terrain values - Low Range Terrain values - Medium Range Terrain values - High Range 
Terrain Terrain Terrain 
County Landcover Topography factor Landcover Topography factor Landcover Topography factor 
% justified on terrain alone % justified on terrain alone % justified on terrain alone 
Adams 60% 60% 36% 60% 60% 36% 70% 70% 49% 
Boone 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Bremer 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Calhoun 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Carroll 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Cedar 60% 60% 36% 60% 60% 36% 70% 70% 49% 
Cerro Gordo 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Cherokee 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Clay 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Emmet 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Henry 60% 60% 36% 60% 60% 36% 70% 70% 49% 
Madison 90% 60% 54% 80% 60% 48% 90% 70% 63% 
Montgomery 30% 60% 18% 40% 60% 24% 50% 70% 35% 
Osceola 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Pocahontas 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Sac 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Story 30% 30% 9% 40% 40% 16% 50% 50% 25% 
Washington 60% 60% 36% 60% 60% 36% 70% 70% 49% 
Woodbury 30% 60% 18% 40% 60% 24% 50% 70% 35% 
After the terrain factor values were created, the number of “justified” stop-controlled 
intersections (based on terrain and volume threshold) was calculated using the following 
equation: 
Equation 2: Number of “justified" stop-controlled intersections based on volume 
and terrain 
Number of “justified” stop-controlled intersections = Total 
number of intersections multiplied by (1 – (1 – % justified 
based on a volume threshold of 100 DEV) x (1 – % 
justified based on terrain)) 
After the number of “justified” stop-controlled intersections was calculated, the fraction 
of excess stop-controlled intersections was recalculated.  
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Table 9. "Justified" stop-controlled intersections based on volume threshold of 100 

DEV and terrain 

County Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
Adams 186 141 141 
Boone 140 89 111 
Bremer 125 94 108 
Calhoun 132 80 103 
Carroll 208 167 185 
Cedar 266 233 233 
Cerro Gordo 157 113 132 
Cherokee 112 62 84 
Clay 113 66 87 
Emmet 53 26 38 
Henry 236 208 208 
Madison 374 344 324 
Montgomery 157 107 125 
Osceola 69 37 51 
Pocahontas 101 53 74 
Sac 135 83 106 
Story 156 119 135 
Washington 314 271 271 
Woodbury 252 191 212 
Table 10. Excess recalculated based on a volume threshold of 100 DEV and terrain 
County Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
Adams 36% 79% 79% 
Boone -33% 6% -15% 
Bremer -9% 20% 5% 
Calhoun 6% 76% 36% 
Carroll 18% 47% 32% 
Cedar -37% -28% -28% 
Cerro Gordo 33% 84% 57% 
Cherokee -17% 51% 11% 
Clay -57% -26% -43% 
Emmet 73% 260% 144% 
Henry -23% -13% -13% 
Madison -62% -58% -56% 
Montgomery 32% 94% 67% 
Osceola 42% 165% 92% 
Pocahontas -34% 25% -11% 
Sac -35% 6% -17% 
Story -92% -90% -91% 
Washington 27% 47% 47% 
Woodbury 46% 93% 73% 
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To determine if there was a relationship between this “percent excess” variable and the 
countywide intersection crash rates, the data was graphed as can be seen below. 
Figure 18. “Percent excess” STOP signs recalculated based on volume threshold and 
terrain 
Figure 18 shows that as the fraction of excess stop-controlled intersections increases, the 
average crash rate per intersection tends to decrease. To determine the strength of this 
relationship, a correlation was completed between “percent excess” and average crash 
rate. The correlation resulted in an insignificant p-value of 0.54. This indicates a weaker 
relationship between crash rate and excess based on volume and terrain than based on 
volume alone. The poor fit may be caused partly because of assumptions used in the 
estimation of intersections that should have sight distance limitations. To validate the 
assumptions used as proxies for sight distance, a field survey of three of the study area 
counties was completed. This field survey indicated that the terrain factor-predicted 
number of sites with sight distance limitations matched two counties well (Adams and 
Boone), but failed to accurately estimate the fraction in the third county (Madison).  
To try to determine the relationship between the use of STOP signs and crash rate, 
another method was used. This method used fewer assumptions and did not base its 
calculation on subjectively created data. 
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Development of an excessive use factor based on Cherokee County 
The “percent excess” calculation was developed using topography and land cover in an 
attempt to represent the fraction of intersections that may have sight distance restrictions 
in a county. An alternative formulation of this calculation assumed that most study area 
counties would be similar and have some minimum number of stop-controlled 
intersections based on available sight distance. The study area county selected was 
Cherokee County. It was assumed that due to the low number of stop-controlled 
intersections (ninety-three), Cherokee County would have stop control where required by 
sight distance and few others controlled in excess. Cherokee County also represents a 
county with average rural terrain, land cover, and traffic volumes.  
To determine a factor based on Cherokee County practice, the number of stop-controlled 
intersections in each county was divided by the number of stop-controlled intersections in 
Cherokee County. The average crash rate per intersection was plotted against this new 
excessive use factor. Figure 19 shows the relationship between the two variables.  
Again, Figure 19 shows a downward trend, i.e., as the Cherokee County factor increases, 
the average crash rate per intersection on a countywide basis tends to decrease. In an 
attempt to quantify the relationship between excessive use of stop-controlled intersections 
and average crash rate, excessive use was defined, for the purpose of this report, as any 
county with more than twice the number of stop-controlled intersections of Cherokee 
County (see Figure 20). 
Figure 19. Relationship between average crash rate and the Cherokee County factor 
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Figure 20. Intersection performance with Cherokee County factor 
Using the excessive use definition, two regression lines (one for counties with excessive 
use and one for the others) were created, as seen in Figure 20. It appears that these two 
lines may intersect near a DEV of about 125 vehicles. Above this point, it appears that 
excessive use of stop control has a detrimental effect on intersection performance. It is 
interesting to note that this intersection point is close to the point (~100 DEV) where 
crash probabilities for controlled and uncontrolled intersections intersected based on the 
logistic regression. 
To determine if the relationship between the Cherokee County factor and average crash 
rate was significant, another correlation was completed. The p-value calculated for this 
correlation was 0.53. Again, this p-value indicated no strong relationship between these 
two variables. 
Even though there is no strong correlation indicated between the excessive use of stop 
control and intersection performance, several graphs indicate the existence of a volume 
threshold, below which there appears to be no statistically significant difference between 
the use of a stop-controlled or an uncontrolled intersection in safety performance. 
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Determination of volume threshold 
There appears to be a volume range, below which there is no statistically significant 
difference in crashes between stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections. Figure 21 
compiles four previous supporting graphs that suggest this volume ranges from about 60 
to 200 DEV. Figure 21a, crashes vs. volume for stop-controlled and uncontrolled 
intersections, indicates a threshold around 60 DEV. Figure 21b uses rate and again 
indicates a threshold around 60 or 70 DEV. The two regression lines in Figure 21c, 
probability of crash, cross at 100 DEV (95% confidence interval 66–140). Above 150-
200, there is clearly a difference. Figure 21d, which incorporates a proxy for sight 
distance (Cherokee factor), suggests a threshold around 125 DEV.   
a) b) 
c) d) 
Figure 21. Comparison of four methods 
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Age group analysis 
As the Iowa driving population ages and younger drivers also enter the mix, an age group 
analysis was completed to determine whether older or younger drivers have more safety 
problems at ultra-low-volume unpaved stop-controlled and uncontrolled intersections. An 
older driver is defined as 65-year-old or older and a younger driver is defined as 19-year-
old or younger. 
Table 11. Statewide crash analysis 
All age groups Younger drivers Older drivers
 Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers 
Statewide (all crashes) 
Statewide (multi-
vehicle crashes) 
59472 
38593 
101987 
81108 
15259 (26%) 
11331 (29%) 
16828 (17%) 
12900 (16%) 
14476 (24%) 
12479 (32%) 
17035 (17%) 
15038 (19%) 
Table 11 shows an analysis completed on a statewide basis. This figure shows that older 
and younger driver representations at the statewide (multi-vehicle crashes) level are 
approximately equal in both crashes and driver involvement categories. 
Table 12 shows the crash analysis that was completed on the stop-controlled intersections 
in this study. The top boldfaced number in each column should be compared to the 
bottom boldfaced number in each column to determine if there is a difference in overall 
statewide multi-vehicle crashes and those at stop-controlled intersections. The table 
shows that older drivers are underrepresented and younger drivers are slightly 
overrepresented at rural unpaved ultra-low-volume stop-controlled intersections.  
Table 13 shows the crash analysis that was completed on the uncontrolled intersections 
involved in this study. Again, the top boldfaced number in each column should be 
compared to the bottom boldfaced number in each column to determine if there is a 
difference in overall statewide multi-vehicle crashes and those at uncontrolled 
intersections. These data appear to be similar to the stop-controlled intersections data. 
The table shows that older drivers are underrepresented and younger drivers are 
overrepresented at rural unpaved ultra-low-volume uncontrolled intersections. 
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Table 12. Crash analysis completed at study stop-controlled intersections 
All age groups Younger drivers Older drivers 
Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers 
Statewide (all crashes) 59472 101987 15259 (26%) 
16828 
(17%) 
14476 
(24%) 
17035 
(17%) 
Statewide (multi-vehicle 
crashes) 
38593 81108 11331 
(29%) 
12900 
(16%) 
12479 
(32%) 
15038 
(19%) 
Stop-controlled Intersections 
Adams* 8 16 1 (13%) 1 (6%) 5 (63%) 6 (38%) 
Boone 29 60 12 (41%) 12 (20%) 3 (10%) 3 (5%) 
Bremer 24 48 11 (46%) 12 (25%) 1 (4%) 1 (2%) 
Calhoun* 13 26 3 (23%) 3 (12%) 2 (15%) 3 (12%) 
Carroll 37 75 12 (32%) 14 (19%) 3 (8%) 3 (4%) 
Cedar 28 57 14 (50%) 15 (26%) 4 (14%) 4 (7%) 
Cerro Gordo* 11 22 1 (9%) 2 (9%) 1 (9%) 1 (5%) 
Cherokee* 5 10 1 (20%) 1 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Clay* 5 10 3 (60%) 3 (30%) 3 (60%) 4 (40%) 
Emmet* 8 16 2 (25%) 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Henry 32 66 9 (28%) 13 (20%) 5 (16%) 5 (8%) 
Madison 17 34 9 (53%) 10 (29%) 1 (6%) 1 (3%) 
Montgomery* 11 22 4 (36%) 5 (23%) 2 (18%) 2 (9%) 
Osceola* 6 12 1 (17%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Pocahontas* 6 12 1 (17%) 1 (8%) 2 (33%) 2 (17%) 
Sac* 8 16 1 (13%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Story* 6 13 1 (17%) 2 (15%) 2 (33%) 2 (15%) 
Washington 30 61 11 (37%) 15 (25%) 2 (7%) 3 (5%) 
Woodbury 37 75 15 (41%) 17 (23%) 8 (22%) 8 (11%) 
Totals 321 651 112 
(35%) 
130 
(20%) 
44 
(14%) 
48 
(7%) 
* Indicates a county with low crash count (statistically unreliable). 
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Table 13. Crash analysis completed at study uncontrolled intersections 
All age groups Younger drivers Older drivers 
Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers Crashes Drivers 
Statewide (all crashes) 59472 
101987 
15259 
(26%) 
16828 
(17%) 
14476 
(24%) 
17035 
(17%) 
Statewide (multi-vehicle 
crashes) 
38593 81108 11331 
(29%) 
12900 
(16%) 
12479 
(32%) 
15038 
(19%) 
Uncontrolled Intersections 
Adams* 1 2 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Boone 40 81 7 (18%) 7 (9%) 4 (10%) 4 (5%) 
Bremer 32 65 
13 
(41%) 
17 
(26%) 9 (28%) 9 (14%) 
Calhoun* 9 18 5 (56%) 5 (28%) 1 (11%) 1 (6%) 
Carroll* 12 26 4 (33%) 5 (19%) 3 (25%) 3 (12%) 
Cedar 16 34 4 (25%) 4 (12%) 4 (25%) 4 (12%) 
Cerro Gordo 16 32 6 (38%) 6 (19%) 4 (25%) 4 (13%) 
Cherokee 20 40 6 (30%) 9 (23%) 4 (20%) 4 (10%) 
Clay 25 50 6 (24%) 7 (14%) 3 (12%) 3 (6%) 
Emmet* 3 6 2 (67%) 2 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Henry* 6 12 5 (83%) 6 (50%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Madison 27 56 
11 
(41%) 
16 
(29%) 2 (7%) 2 (4%) 
Montgomery* 4 8 2 (50%) 2 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Osceola* 5 10 2 (40%) 2 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (20%) 
Pocahontas 15 30 6 (40%) 7 (23%) 2 (13%) 2 (7%) 
Sac 19 38 5 (26%) 5 (13%) 5 (26%) 5 (13%) 
Story 76 152 
17 
(22%) 
19 
(13%) 
14 
(18%) 
16 
(11%) 
Washington* 13 28 3 (23%) 4 (14%) 3 (23%) 3 (11%) 
Woodbury* 7 14 1 (14%) 1 (7%) 1 (14%) 1 (7%) 
Totals 346 702 105 
(30%) 
124 
(18%) 
61 
(18%) 
63 
(9%) 
* Indicates a county with low crash count (statistically unreliable). 
There are two possible reasons for the considerable underrepresentation of older drivers 
at all unpaved ultra-low-volume study intersections. This may indicate that older drivers 
either use appropriate caution and have no difficulty negotiating these intersections or 
they avoid these locations. 
Crash type analysis 
An analysis of thirty intersections (fifteen stop-controlled and fifteen uncontrolled) that 
had at least two multi-vehicle crashes over the ten-year period was completed to 
determine if any specific crash type or contributing circumstance was more or less 
prevalent for either type of control. This analysis was also completed to determine if the 
crash reports available at the Iowa DOT could add any value to the information already 
included in the crash database. 
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Table 14. Comparison of crash types for thirty study intersections 
Uncontrolled intersections Stop-controlled intersections 
Crash type from crash 
data 
Number of 
crashes 
Crash type from crash 
data 
Number of 
crashes 
Broadside/Right angle 21 Broadside/Right angle 27 
NA 6 Head on 1 
Sideswipe 4 Sideswipe 1 
Rear end 2 Angle 1 
Head on 2 Other 1 
Other 1 NA 1 
Non-collision 1 
Table 14 shows a comparison of crash types for the thirty intersections involved in the 
analysis. As expected, the most prominent crash type for both stop-controlled and 
uncontrolled intersections was broadside/right angle. 
Table 15 shows the contributing circumstances determined from both the crash database 
and the crash reports for stop-controlled intersection crashes. The most prominent 
contributing circumstance for stop-controlled intersections was failure to yield the right-
of-way. However, the most prominent type of failure to yield the right-of-way was not 
caused by the failure to stop at a STOP sign, but rather drivers judging gaps ineffectively.  
Table 16 shows the contributing circumstances determined from both the crash database 
and the crash reports for uncontrolled intersection crashes. The most prominent 
contributing circumstance for uncontrolled intersections was failure to yield the right-of-
way as well. 
It is also interesting to note that sight distance and vision obscured issues are not major 
crash contributing factors. 
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Table 15. Contributing circumstances from stop-controlled intersection crashes 
Contributing circumstances 
from crash reports 
Number of 
crashes 
Contributing circumstances 
from crash data 
Number of 
crashes 
FTYROW - made full stop but 
pulled out in front of another 
vehicle 
17 NA 25 
Failed to stop at STOP sign and 
pulled out in front of another 
vehicle 
10 FTYROW 14 
Attempted to stop at STOP sign 
but slid through intersection 
colliding with another vehicle 
3 No improper action 11 
Sight distance related 3 Ran STOP sign 9 
Passing another vehicle 1 Speed too fast for conditions 3 
Rear end - not paying attention 1 Other improper action 2 
Alcohol involvement 1 Vision obscured 2 
Crossed centerline 1 
Failure to have control 1 
Passing where prohibited 1 
Improper signal 1 
Inattentive/distracted 1 
Passed stopped school bus 1 
Table 16. Contributing circumstances from uncontrolled intersection crashes 
Contributing circumstances from 
crash reports 
Number of 
crashes 
Contributing circumstances 
from crash data 
Number of 
crashes 
FTYROW - pulled out in front of 
another vehicle 28 NA 28 
Rear end - not paying attention 4 FTYROW 21 
Sight distance related 4 Failure to have control 5 
Passing another vehicle  3 No improper action 4 
Corn crop causing sight distance issues 2 Vision obscured 4 
Too fast for conditions 3 
Crossed Centerline 2 
Other improper action 2 
Following too close 1 
Illegal/improper parking 1 
Improper signal 1 
Improper turn 1 
Inattentive/distracted 1 
Passing where prohibited 1 
Wrong way/side of road 1 
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Urban applications 
The excessive use of stop control may be a problem in urban areas. A study similar to 
that for the county rural intersections was also completed in the City of Ames, Iowa. As a 
sign inventory was unavailable, a video log of many intersections in the City of Ames 
was created as part of this project. This video log was used to create a traffic control 
database for the City of Ames. This database facilitated the comparison of safety at 
controlled and uncontrolled intersections.  
The methodology for the urban study was similar to that of the rural part of this project 
with only a few minor differences. Rather than using a 150-foot tolerance, 75-foot 
tolerance was used to identify crashes (the standard distance used by the Iowa DOT for 
the identification of urban intersection crashes). The City of Ames was divided into 
twelve neighborhoods, and control type characteristics (crashes, crash rate, etc.) were 
summarized by neighborhood. This aggregation was completed to attempt to quantify a 
relationship between excessive use and crashes or crash rate for urban areas. A map 
showing the neighborhoods involved in the study can be seen in Figure 22 and an 
example summary table can be seen in Table 17. 
Figure 22. Map of City of Ames neighborhoods 
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Table 17. Neighborhood summary 
Ontario Neighborhood Control Type 
No Control Yield Stop Stop (All-way) Signal Total 
Avg rate per MEV 1.33 1.56 2.41 0.70 1.83 
Avg DEV 690 1060 1260 1580 1010 
Avg crashes 1.50 6 3.18 4 2.61 
Number of intersections 10 1 11 1 0 23 
% total intersections 43.5 4.4 47.8 4.4 
Max rate 5.48 1.56 7.89 0.70 7.89 
Min rate 0.23 1.56 0.10 0.70 0.10 
Max DEV 1208 1057 8300 1575 8300 
Min DEV 50 1057 129 1575 50 
Max crashes 3 6 8 4 8 
Min crashes 1 6 1 4 1 
Total crashes 15 6 35 4 60 
The neighborhood summaries were combined to create a summary for the City of Ames 
(see Table 18).  
Nearly 60% of the intersections involved in this urban study are two-way stop-controlled 
intersections, whereas only 10% are all-way stop controlled. Uncontrolled intersections 
have a slightly higher average crash rate than two-way stop-controlled intersections (1.0 
to 0.9), and all-way stop-controlled intersections have the lowest crash rate of any control 
type in the study (0.57). Yield-controlled intersections have a high average crash rate, 
although the sample size is quite limited. Figure 23 shows the relationship between 
average crash rate and average DEV per intersection based on control type for the 
intersections involved in the urban study. 
Table 18. Summary of Ames intersections 
 Control Type 
No Control Yield Stop Stop (All-way) Signal Total 
Avg rate per MEV 1.00 1.50 0.90 0.57 0.95 0.91 
Avg DEV 790 900 5100 6130 17600 5900 
Avg crashes 1.58 3.56 5.92 10.90 61.54 12.25 
Number of intersections 33 9 130 21 26 219 
% total intersections 15.1 4.1 59.4 9.6 11.9 
Max rate 5.48 6.39 13.70 2.19 3.45 13.70 
Min rate 0.08 0.41 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.04 
Max DEV 3546 1351 21803 10685 24350 24350 
Min DEV 50 300 50 1206 8900 50 
Max crashes 5 7 40 29 123 123 
Min crashes 1 2 1 1 3 1 
Total crashes 52 32 769 229 1600 2682 
Figure 23 shows that majority of uncontrolled intersections are low volume. This figure 
also shows that all-way stop-controlled intersections have a lower average crash rate than 
uncontrolled and two-way stop-controlled intersections. Figure 24 illustrates the crash 
performance of each type of control. 
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Figure 23. Intersection performance for the City of Ames neighborhoods 
Figure 24. Intersection performance of Ames intersections 
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Statistical Assessment 
A hierarchical Poisson model was fitted to the Ames crash data. The model indicates that 
crash frequencies at an intersection are distributed as Poisson variables with mean λ * 
DEV, where here λ is defined as crash frequency divided by DEV. The log of lambda is 
then modeled as a function of the type of control and a random error. Because very few 
yield-controlled intersections were available in this data set, the yield-controlled and the 
uncontrolled intersections were grouped together. Dummy variables were defined for the 
four types of control, and the no control group was used as the reference. The error in the 
second level of the model was assumed to be normal (implying that log (λ) is also 
normal).  
Estimates of model parameters were obtained using a Bayesian approach (45). The 
regression coefficients associated to control types were assigned non-informative normal 
prior distributions with zero mean and very large variance. This indicates that, a priori, 
we do not assume any differences in crash rates due to control type. The prior distribution 
for the variance of the error was an inverted gamma distribution with mean equal to one 
and a very large variance, again to reflect prior ignorance about the distribution of the 
error. A priori, the regression coefficients and the variance component were assumed to 
be independent, and the joint prior distribution was semi-conjugate to the sampling 
distribution. 
The model using WinBUGS and Markov chain Monte Carlo methods were fitted. 
Obtained were posterior distributions of expected crash frequency at each intersection 
(where frequency is defined as the expected number of crashes at the intersection given 
its DEV), expected crash rate at each intersection (defined here as the number of crashes 
per million entering vehicles [MEV]), and expected average crash rate at intersections of 
each of the different types.  
Posterior distributions are summarized by their mean, standard deviation, and 2.5th, 50th, 
and 97.5th percentile. A central 95% posterior credible set is given by the set bounded by 
the 2.5th and the 97.5th posterior percentiles. Table 19 shows the posterior distributions 
of expected crash rates (number of crashes per MEV) at intersections with each of the 
four control types. For example, the likely values of crash rate for intersections with a 
two-way STOP sign are 0.27 to 0.30. 
If the credible sets for two types of intersections do not overlap, it is concluded that there 
are significant differences between them. For example, signal-controlled intersections 
have significantly higher crash rates than all others. Two-way stop-controlled 
intersections have significantly lower crash rates than all others. There is no difference in 
crash rates between the all-way and the uncontrolled intersections. The plots in Figure 25 
show the posterior distributions of crash rates for the various intersection types.  
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Table 19. Expected crash rates 
Type Mean Std 2.5th 
percentile 
Median 97.5th 
percentile 
Signal 0.90 0.02 0.87 0.91 0.95 
Two-way 0.28 0.01 0.27 0.29 0.30 
All-way 0.46 0.03 0.40 0.46 0.52 
No control 0.41 0.04 0.33 0.41 0.50 
Figure 25. Crash rate distributions based on control type 
Effect of excessive use 
To attempt to quantify a relationship between excessive use and crash rate/number of 
crashes for urban areas, a simple excessive use factor was created. The number of two-
way stop-controlled intersections was divided by the total number of intersections in each 
neighborhood to determine the fraction of total intersections that were two-way stop 
controlled. Anything above average is termed “excessive;” though, clearly, other factors 
for use may be involved. This same procedure was then completed for all-way stop-
controlled intersections. Figure 26 shows the relationship between average number of 
crashes per intersection in ten years and DEV stratified by this excessive use calculation. 
The figure indicates that neighborhoods which have a higher fraction of two-way stop-
controlled intersections than the citywide average tend to have more crashes over ten 
years for any given level of DEV, indicating a negative effect of possible excessive use, 
contrary to the rural findings. 
Figure 27 shows overall and stop-controlled crash rates for each neighborhood versus 
fractional control. Contradictory to the findings shown in Figure 26, this analysis 
indicates a slight positive impact on safety performance of excessive STOP sign use. 
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Figure 26. Effect of excessive stop control on urban crash frequency 
Figure 27. Effect of stop control on urban crash rate 
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Figure 28. Effect of excessive all-way stop control on urban crash frequency 
Figure 28 shows the same relationship for all-way stops. Possibly due to small sample 
size, there is no discernable difference in safety performance of intersections in 
neighborhoods with more or less all-way stop control. 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
Removal or reduction techniques for unneeded stop control 
The following sections of this report present suggested procedures (legal and operational) 
for the removal or reduction in the level of intersection traffic control. Various resources 
(14, 18, 27, 43, and 44) were used as references in the development of these 
recommendations, summarized as follows: 
• Develop and adopt a formal policy 
• Undertake a thorough engineering study 
• Provide appropriate public notice 
• Perform follow-up assessment 
Preliminary activities 
According to the MUTCD, traffic control devices can only be established as authorized 
by the public authority or official having jurisdiction. Removal or reduction of these 
devices must also be properly authorized. Before any action is contemplated, a formal 
policy should be adopted by the governing board or council. This policy should outline 
criteria for selection of locations and public notice to be provided at a minimum. Advice 
from the agency attorney should be sought in advance.  
Judgment should be exercised in selecting possible locations for reduction or removal of 
existing traffic control, including STOP signs. After sites have been identified, a 
thorough engineering study of each location should be conducted, considering minimum 
traffic volumes, sight distance restrictions, and crash history. Study information should be 
properly documented. 
Following approval of removal/reduction proposals by the governing authority, public 
notice must be provided. Local news media should be utilized to publicize the proposals 
and consideration given to provide specific notice to residents in the immediate area of 
the modifications. 
Prior to actual modification of traffic control, appropriate temporary advisory signing 
should be installed. The following signing and process is suggested for removal of STOP 
signs. 
Approximately 30 days preceding the date of change, install an advisory sign below or in 
advance of the signs to be removed, “THIS STOP SIGN WILL BE REMOVED ON 
____/____/____.” Beneath or in advance of signs to remain, install “CROSS STREET 
(ROAD) STOP WILL BE REMOVED ON ____/____/____.” On the date selected for 
removal, selected STOP signs, advance STOP AHEAD signs, and advisory signs should 
be removed and special warning signs, “WATCH FOR CROSS TRAFFIC,” erected at an 
appropriated distance in advance of the intersection. These signs should remain in place 
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for a minimum of three months after removal of the STOP signs. In urban locations, any 
inappropriate stop bars should also be removed. For the STOP signs remaining in place, 
the “CROSS STREET (ROAD) STOP WILL BE REMOVED ON ___/___/___” should 
be removed and special signs stating “WATCH FOR CROSS TRAFFIC” installed at the 
appropriate location in advance of the subject intersection. Consideration should be given 
to mounting a red flag above the remaining STOP signs for at least 30 days. 
Post conversion activities  
It may be advisable to conduct an engineering study before removing the “WATCH FOR 
CROSS TRAFFIC” signs. Driver behavior on the date of the removal should be 
monitored to identify any potential concerns. Consideration should be given to repeating 
the process one week and one month later. Appropriate action should be taken if 
improper behavior, near misses, or increasing crash experience is observed. 
It may also be desirable to conduct additional studies following any reduction in the level 
of traffic control, such as speed and volume analyses. It should be noted that very low 
traffic volume locations may require several years to provide sufficient data for a 
meaningful analysis. 
Legal liability resulting from the removal of STOP signs  
The issue of legal liability of a city or county (hereafter called agencies or agency) that 
remove unwarranted and unneeded STOP signs is a matter of Tort Law and, in the case 
of Iowa, the Iowa Code (Iowa Law). There are two parts to the potential for 
governmental liability for removal of a STOP sign. One part is related to whether the 
agency removing the sign has exposed motorists to undue hazard as a result of removing 
a STOP sign and, therefore, had a duty to maintain an unwarranted sign. The other part 
deals with statutory immunity provided to the agency through the Iowa Code.  
Statutory immunity 
Chapter 668 of the Iowa Code covers comparative fault—more commonly called 
comparative negligence. Comparative negligence assigns fault for damages suffered by a 
damaged party. A motorist may be partly responsible for her/his own damages, and thus 
assigned part of the fault for their own damages. So long as the motorist is not 
responsible for more than half of the negligence that resulted in damages, the plaintiff has 
a reasonable claim. For example, if a motorist is damaged by an obvious defect (e.g., a 
traffic signal shows green for two conflicting movements) and a crash results, there is 
clearly negligence associated with the operation of the traffic signal. However, if that 
motorist was also speeding at the time and the high speed was partly to blame for the 
damages, the plaintiff might be assigned part of the fault. 
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Chapter 668, section 10, defines the situations in which the government is exempt in the 
assignment of fault. Part 1 of 668.10 deals specifically with STOP signs and provides 
statutory immunity for not erecting a sign that is not warranted by the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The Iowa Code § 668.10 (1) states the 
following: 
668.10 GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTIONS. 

In any action brought pursuant to this chapter, the state or a municipality 

shall not be assigned a percentage of fault for any of the following: 

1. The failure to place, erect, or install a STOP sign, traffic control device, 

or other regulatory sign as defined in the uniform manual for traffic 

control devices adopted pursuant to section 321.252. However, once a 

regulatory device has been placed, created or installed, the state or 

municipality may be assigned a percentage of fault for its failure to 

maintain the device. (1) 

It appears that the roadway agency is provided statutory immunity from negligence 
related to failure to erect a sign. Thus, if a sign is not warranted, a claimant cannot claim 
negligence for a sign which does not exist. When a sign is removed, even if it is not 
warranted, a plaintiff may argue that the agency failed to maintain the sign and the 
roadway agency can be assigned fault. 
In a related Iowa negligence case, the plaintiff argued negligence due to failure to 
maintain the sign when a sign was not erected (30). In this case, the county had recently 
paved an unpaved roadway. The roadway approached a small community from the south 
and made two slight curves—first to the left, followed by a 700-foot tangent section, and 
then to the right. When the roadway was unpaved, a reverse curve sign was located 
before the first curve to provide warning for both curves. After the roadway was paved, 
the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle. While traveling 
north on the roadway, the driver successfully navigated through the first curve (where the 
warning sign existed), but veered off the road into a ditch after taking the second curve at 
a high speed. The plaintiff argued that the county was at fault because the county had 
clearly seen the need for a warning sign, and one sign was not a sufficient warning for 
both curves when the curves are separated by 700 feet. Therefore, it had erected a sign 
and failed to maintain it, thus causing the crash. 
Ultimately, the case (Saunders versus Dallas County) was appealed to the Iowa Supreme 
court and the court found for Dallas County and stated the following: 
The county clearly would have been immune from liability if it had erected no signs 
at the scene. For immunity to be lost it must appear as a minimum that the signs 
were erected in such a manner as to mislead or endanger the driver. We think the 
allegations here all come down to decisions about whether or where to place traffic 
signs. Negligent decisions of this kind are precisely the ones which section 668.10 
(1) immunizes from liability (30). 
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In the case of the removal of an unwarranted STOP sign, a plaintiff would make a similar 
argument suggesting that the responsible agency was negligent due to a failure to 
maintain the sign. However, based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Saunders 
versus Dallas County case, it seems unlikely that the plaintiff would be successful. If the 
STOP sign is unwarranted and sight distances are adequate, there is no hazard. There 
should be no liability for removing a sign where the agency would have not been liable 
had it not erected a sign in the first place. 
Is this a valid tort action? 
The agency maintaining the roadway has the duty to motorists to maintain the roadway in 
a safe condition, so as to not expose motorists to undue hazard. In cases where a hazard 
exists, the operating agency has the duty to eliminate or warn the motorist of that hazard. 
Therefore, if an agency fails to perform its duty through either commission or omission 
of action which results in unsafe condition, the agency is negligent (tort law concepts are 
taken from Glennon [12]). 
To have a valid tort action, the following need to occur: 
1. The plaintiff has to have suffered damages. 
2. The defendant has to have a legal duty to the plaintiff (keeping roadways safe). 
3. The defendant was negligent because its duty was breached. 
4. The negligence has to be the cause of the damages.  
Tort law is based on precedent from prior cases, and the only way to determine whether 
the removal of an unwarranted STOP sign increases the legal liability of an agency is for 
an injury to occur at the location of a STOP sign removal. Then, the damaged party must 
claim the agency was negligent for removing the sign.  
A court case was found where the conditions were similar to the conditions considered 
when removing an unwarranted STOP sign. This case was heard before the Court of 
Appeals of the State of California, Third Appellate District (2). The case, “City of South 
Lake Tahoe v. Markham, 62 Cal.App. 4th 971, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 146 (1998),” involved a 
local resident on a local street in the City of South Lake Tahoe. Earlier that day, a STOP 
sign at the intersection of Third and Eloise (a two-way stop-controlled intersection) was 
knocked down in a crash. Since Markham frequently drove through the intersection in the 
direction without the stop control, he was accustomed to having the right-of-way at this 
intersection. 
After the STOP sign was knocked down in the opposite direction, Markham drove 
through the intersection and collided with the car of a second driver, Huff. Huff was from 
out of town and did not see the downed STOP sign. The plaintiffs were consolidated to 
one action by the court, and claimed that the cause of the damages was the City’s failure 
to maintain the STOP sign. There have been similar cases where a STOP sign is knocked 
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down and the roadway agency failed to re-erect the STOP sign expeditiously and a crash 
resulted. The issue in these cases often becomes whether the roadway agency had 
constructive notice. In other words, was the roadway agency aware of the situation but 
failed to react in a timely fashion. The difference in this case was that the STOP signs 
were not warranted at this intersection due to low volume, and the operation of the 
intersection without two-way stop control did not present a hazard. 
California legal code contains a statutory exemption, similar to that of the Iowa code, 
where an agency has immunity from legal liability for injuries caused by not erecting a 
sign. However, once a sign is erected, no immunity exists for failure to maintain the 
traffic control device (Section 830.8 of the “California Government Code”) (3). When the 
case was first heard in the Superior Court of El Dorado County, the court found that 
“Section 830.4 did not immunize the defendant, and that there was a triable issue of fact 
as to whether the failure to replace the STOP sign gave rise to a dangerous condition” (2). 
Later, when heard in the Appellate court, the lower court’s finding was overturned. The 
Appellate court found the following: 
The basic premise of defendant’s summary judgment motion is that since it has no 
duty to provide a STOP sign in the first place, and by virtue of section 830.4, could 
not be held liable if no sign had ever existed at the corner of Third and Eloise, it 
cannot become liable if the sign is removed, whatever the reason for the removal 
may be. We find this logic persuasive. To conclude otherwise would require us to 
accept the proposition that once the STOP sign on Eloise was in place it could never 
be removed with impunity, and that motorists, particularly those on Third Street, 
could forever after rely on its presence. This reasoning, which is implicit in the 
plaintiffs’ arguments, finds no support in statute or case law. 
In California case law, an agency can remove a STOP sign, as long as an uncontrolled 
intersection does not present a hazard and can still be covered under statutory immunity. 
Although this California case does provide an interesting example of how California 
courts manage the removal of a STOP sign, it does not necessarily imply that a similarly 
argued case in an Iowa courtroom would result in the same interpretation. However, it 
seems unlikely that a different result would occur.  
What else can be done to offer protection? 
In addition to the protections offered by statutory immunity, the agency can protect itself 
by exercising the doctrine of discretionary immunity. Iowa Code §670.4 identifies claims 
against a municipality (city or county) that are exempt from action (Part 3 provides 
employees with discretionary immunity). An employee cannot be held liable for omission 
or commission of action that is within the scope of his/her job and where the act required 
discretion and he/she exercised due care in executing the job. The Iowa State Association 
of Counties, in their legal briefing on this section in Iowa Code, interprets this section as 
follows:  
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Basically, Iowa Code §670.4 says that government officials (including 
county officials) are not liable where the challenged conduct involved a 
matter of choice or an element of judgment. In other words, there can be 
no “Monday morning quarterbacking” of policy decisions county officials 
make. (7) 
To test whether a function is a discretionary function and hence deserves immunity, Iowa 
courts have applied the Berkovitz test (34). This test involves “first considering whether 
the action involved a matter of choice on the part of those acting for the government. If 
so, it must also appear that the challenged judgment call is of the kind the discretionary 
function was designed to shield.” 
Iowa Code §670.4 Part 4 states: 
Discretionary function immunity is based upon the design to prevent 
judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions 
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of 
an action of tort. (1) 
Thus, to be discretionary, first, the activity must involve a matter of choice, and second, 
the activity must involve legislative and administrative decisions ground in social, 
economic, and political policy. A recent Iowa court case involving a crash at a traffic 
signal illustrates how Iowa courts more strictly define what a discretionary action is (35). 
The plaintiff argued that a crash was caused by the City of Ankeny providing a too short 
yellow interval at the intersection of State Street and Oralabor Road. When the plaintiff 
entered the intersection immediately after the signal turned green in her direction, a car 
coming in the conflicting direction collided with her. The second motorist claimed she 
could not stop during the allotted yellow interval. The plaintiff claimed that the City was 
negligent by not properly setting the signal timings. The City claimed the act of timing a 
traffic signal required independent judgment and, therefore, the City should be immune.  
Initially, the trial court found in favor of the City. The plaintiff then appealed the 
judgment to the District Court of Polk County, which also found in favor of the City. In 
the second appeal to Iowa’s Supreme Court, the decisions of the lower courts were 
reversed. The Supreme Court found that traffic signal timing was not the type of 
discretionary activity that the Iowa Statute was designed to hold immune. The Supreme 
Court found that many government employees must make choices and use discretion in 
numerous activities, but that does not make them immune from tort action. The Court 
stated that the “city did not have discretionary function immunity because its judgment in 
setting the timing of the traffic light was based on nothing more than a generic safety 
consideration and did not involve legitimate policy-based considerations.” 
Three other Iowa cases bear on the discretionary function exception and traffic control 
device immunity: Davison v. State, 671 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa App. 2030); Schmitz v. City 
of Dubuque, 682 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 2004); and Hunt v. State, 538 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 
App. 1995). 
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Although case law does not provide a clear example of a specific situation where an 
agency has removed a STOP sign, there are steps that an engineer or road manager can 
do to increase the probability that they and their agency will be successful in invoking 
discretionary immunity. This can be done by developing a policy that spells out the steps 
to be taken before a STOP sign is removed, which might include the following: 
1.	 A site visit to the intersection to review sight distance and other potential hazards 
2.	 A review of crash records for the intersection to identify a pattern of crashes that 
might be exacerbated if the sign is removed 
3.	 A check of traffic volumes and planned development around the intersection to 
make sure that current volume or future volume will not make an uncontrolled 
intersection hazardous 
4.	 A plan for informing the local residents when the STOP sign will be removed 
5.	 A plan for any interim steps such as the use of YIELD signs for a period (e.g., one 
year) after removing the STOP signs 
6.	 Monitor the operation of the intersection following the removal of the STOP sign 
The city or county policy board needs to adopt the plan and then document the 
completion of each step when considering an intersection for the removal of stop control. 
Having a plan that is adopted by the policy board, following the plan, and documenting 
the results of the steps once they are completed will provide the roadway manager or 
engineer and his/her agency with a greater likelihood of receiving discretionary 
immunity. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This report investigated the effect of stop control on the operation and safety performance 
of ultra-low-volume (<150 DEV) unpaved, rural intersections. Several conclusions can be 
drawn from this research. 
Survey results indicated that Iowa counties do not utilize consistent procedures for 
establishing stop control at low-volume rural intersections. Most use available sight 
distance and crash history as criteria for stop control. 
The intersections involved in this study not only had very low volumes but also exhibited 
very low crash rates (crashes were very rare events for all types of control involved in 
this study). Crash rates observed at ultra-low volume intersections were much lower than 
rates for local rural roads in general.  
Intersections with two-way stop control tended to have lower crash rates than 
uncontrolled above a certain threshold DEV value. Below this threshold, there appeared 
to be no statistically significant difference between the safety performance of a stop-
controlled or uncontrolled intersection.  
The fraction of stop-controlled intersections in a rural area did not appear to affect the 
general crash rate for that jurisdiction.  
Several references with guidelines for conversion of all-way to two-way stop control or 
two-way stop control to yield control are available, but no guidance for removal of stop 
control could be found. 
Older driver crash rates are underrepresented at ultra-low-volume rural unpaved 
intersections (both stop-controlled and uncontrolled). This may mean that either older 
drivers use more caution at these intersections or they avoid these types of intersections 
altogether. Younger drivers however, experienced crashes at rates somewhat higher at 
these locations than for rural roads in general.  
As expected, broadside/right angle crashes are the most prominent multi-vehicle crash 
types for both stop-controlled and uncontrolled ultra-low-volume unpaved intersections. 
The most prominent contributing circumstance at these intersections is failure to yield the 
right-of-way. However, at stop-controlled intersections, that failure to yield the right-of-
way cannot be attributed to ignoring the STOP sign. Instead, drivers tended to 
insufficiently judge gaps and proceeded into the path of oncoming vehicles. In addition, 
restricted sight distance was not listed as a major contributor to crashes at uncontrolled 
intersections. 
The amount of possible excess stop-controlled intersections for each county was 
calculated several different ways. It was not possible in this study to develop a surrogate 
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for the relative number of intersections that would be expected to have sight distance 
limitations based on county land cover and topography. Therefore, none of these 
calculations proved to be significant indicators of the countywide crash rate. Instead of 
the creation of an excessive use factor for an entire county, a smaller area could be used. 
This may make the creation of the factor more driver-specific and accurate.  
Even though a surrogate for sight distance could not be created, it appeared as though 
there is a threshold DEV value of about 150 vehicles, below which there is no statistically 
significant difference between the use of a stop-controlled or uncontrolled intersection.  
If accomplished in accord with a formal policy and supported by an engineering study 
and judgment, significant liability exposure should not result from modification of 
intersection traffic control. 
Results of an urban area study are inconclusive regarding the effect of additional stop 
control on overall intersection crash rates. However, more research in urban areas is 
needed. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1) Agencies should consider the adoption of formal policies for establishment of control 
levels at intersections and for modification of that control when perceived beneficial.   
2) Local rural agencies could consider removal or conversion of two-way stop control at 
selected ultra-low-volume unpaved intersections, if certain criteria are met. 
3) Urban agencies may also benefit from removal of unwarranted control from 
intersections, but more study is needed. 
4) Intermittent sight distance restrictions at intersections may be satisfactorily addressed 
through the use of yield control1. 
FUTURE STUDY 
A future study may include a long-term analysis of the actual removal/conversion of 
several stop-controlled intersections. The results of these modifications could be used to 
quantify the difference in intersection performance between the before and after 
1 Section 2B.09 YIELD Sign Applications in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices has been 
revised to restrict YIELD sign use to intersection where minimum stopping sight distance is available. It is 
recommended that consideration be given to expanding potential use to that described in earlier editions of 
the MUTCD. Of particular concern are intersections where sight distance is only restricted part of the year, 
such as by growing crops. YIELD signs could be used effectively in these situations if expanded 
application opportunities were included in Section 2B.09 of the MUTCD. 
60

condition. Several intersections with only seasonal sight distance issues could be 
established with yield control to determine if the performance of a YIELD sign is equal 
to that of a STOP sign at intersections with only seasonal sight distance issues. If 
conversions are completed at intersections with very low traffic volumes as well as low 
crash rates, the after analysis period may need to be significantly long to collect enough 
data to complete an adequate before and after comparison. Appropriate statistical 
techniques should also be applied to address the small sample size issues and possible 
regression to the mean. Additional study of various levels of traffic control would also be 
beneficial at low-volume urban intersections.  
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